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Abstract 
 
Perception of risks and related costs associated with energy crop cultivation pose a barrier to 
expansion of production, and therefore economies-of-scale are not achieved and investments 
in new infrastructure harder to justify. In this study, the risk perceptions for agro-biofuel 
production in Sweden, France and Finland are delineated and a new contractual arrangement 
to reduce such risk perceptions proposed based on 55 in-depth interviews conducted with 
agro-biofuel producers and users. 
The proposed contract model is based on three factors; degree of duration (number of years), 
degree of flexibility (number of price negotiations per year or per contract duration, and 
possibility to cancel the contract if circumstances change) and degree of cost control (the 
producers’ level of integration into the production chain). It was found that the degree of 
duration preferably is medium-long, about 5 years, and the flexibility high, whereas the degree 
of cost control might vary between farmers depending on their activity level and possession of 
machinery and negotiation skills. Entrepreneurial farmers with machinery and high negotiation 
skills want a high degree of cost control, in particular if the energy crop is a large share of their 
income. Active farmers prefer a medium high degree of cost control, assisting during harvest 
with own machinery (such as driving a side-wagon next to the harvester) and inactive farmers 
a low degree of cost control because they value the low labour-input. 
The price of the agro-biofuel product is linked to the price of conventional biofuels (such as 
wood chips from forestry), but with shared risk of increased prices for transport fuel via a 
partial indexation of the price to the diesel price. “Windfall profits” from for example 
subsidies or the CO emission trading scheme are suggested to be allocated to the producer as 
an incentive for production. 
2
The active farmers were found to be the least satisfied with the decision to grow an energy 
crop, in part because they to a larger extent have substituted cereal production with energy 
crop production, and the grain prices rose dramatically in the beginning of 2008, and in part 
because they have difficulties to be as profitable as the entrepreneurial farmers (who can 
harvest themselves and negotiate contracts directly with the fuel-users, thus avoiding costly 
middlehands) and have higher demand on profitability than the inactive farmers (who have 
retired or work outside the farm).  
I 
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Executive Summary 
 
Background 
Cultivation of energy crops on arable land (in this study referred to as agro-biofuel) is an 
alternative business activity for farmers who want to diversify their production portfolio and 
venture into new markets. Renewable sources of primary energy are expected to play an 
important role in securing energy supply and sustainable development in the European Union 
in the future, and by 2020, the share of renewable energy of the total energy consumption 
shall be 20 % and the share of biofuels in the vehicle fuel mix 10 % according to the 
European energy policy (2007). Today, bioenergy constitute 64 % of the renewable energy 
supply in the Union, and 4 % of total domestic energy supply. The share of domestic energy 
supply is expected to double by 2010 (Swedish Energy Agency, 2008). 
 
The interest from farmers to grow energy crops on cropland is however hardly overwhelming 
today. Surveys show that there are significant barriers to the uptake of these energy crops, 
including real and perceived production- and market risks. These risk perceptions could 
potentially be reduced by new contractual arrangements.  
 
However, as of now the risk perceptions for commercial agro-biofuel production are not 
sufficiently investigated and delineated, which is necessary to understand the potential of new 
contractual forms for commercial production of agro-biofuel.  
 
Research questions 
The overarching research question is: 
 
How is a contractual arrangement with potential to reduce risk perceptions for 
commercial agro-biofuel production designed? 
 
The two sub-questions are: 
 
1 What are the real and perceived risks associated with agro-biofuel 
production and use? 
 
2 What are the preferences of producers and fuel-users regarding 
contractual arrangements? 
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Methodology 
55 in-depth, semi-structured interviews have been carried out in this study. Stakeholders in 
Sweden, France and Finland, mainly agro-biofuel producers and users, but also intermediate 
buyers and experts in the field of agro-biofuel have been interviewed. 
 
Three categories of producers were developed by the author, based on the level of importance 
of the agro-biofuel-production in the overall farm business and in fact as a consequence of a 
noted difference in how the farmers respond to the pre-specified questions within the three 
categories. These were entrepreneurial farmers (high importance of energy crop production on 
overall income), active farmers (medium high to low importance of energy crop production on 
overall income) and inactive farmers (low importance of energy crop production on overall 
income, often retirees or landowners who work outside the farm).  
 
 
Risk perceptions 
The study indicates that energy crops should be planted by entrepreneurial farmers or inactive 
farmers. The first category can integrate far into the production chain and contain both 
farmers and “businessmen” to some extent, i.e. can negotiate with power plants themselves, 
and the inactive farmers will accept a low economic return from the land in return for small 
labor inputs. For active farmers to be producing energy crops, the price should be higher and 
the organization stronger among the farmers themselves, in order for them to have a higher 
control over costs and more alternatives on the market.  
 
For the grass crops like hemp, miscanthus, switchgrass and RCG, the production risk is in fact 
perceived as lower than for cereals. Harvesting techniques, other logistical issues and 
combustion technologies for dry crops with relatively high ash content and low ash melting 
points (compared to wood chips) need to be further improved in order to increase 
competitiveness and reduce costs. These production issues thus have significant implications 
for the economic results from the production activity.  
 
A medium high degree of duration of a contract reduces the market risk perception. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the market risk was found to constitute a tangible risk in all cases 
due to the insufficiently evolved markets, except for the Finnish case, where the 5-year 
contracts with fuel-users appear to suit both parties, and in a few cases in France where the 7-
year contracts with the buyer were perceived as satisfying.  
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Both the market situation and the policy situation are almost exclusively expected to work in 
favor of the agro-biofuel producers (i.e., higher price) in the future. Policies are however 
perceived as volatile both for agricultural production and for bioenergy, and a business activity 
strongly dependent on policy is not perceived as reliable. A more reliable policy environment 
could therefore increase the uptake of energy crops as well as the use of energy crops by heat- 
and power producers. 
 
The need for information is hardly overwhelming, since most farmers today have internet-
connection and access to advisors. However, experience exchange and study visits among 
farmers were requested, in particular in Sweden. More contacts with markets and potential 
buyers was also requested, and a potential means of strengthening the energy crop producers’ 
market position would be to provide consultations with marketing experts – marketing is 
hardly what the typical farmer is used to or trained for, but perhaps what the farmer who 
wants to succeed on the energy market (in the case of agro-biofuel, the energy market is local 
or regional due to a feasible transportation distance maximum of about 100 km) needs.   
 
Contract preferences and proposal for a new contractual model 
Based on the results from interviews with growers and users of energy crops, it appears that a 
preferable duration is some 5 years, i.e. medium high degree of duration. However, if it is to 
achieve some outcome, the degree of duration should be compensated by a high degree of 
flexibility to attract the farmers, who particularly in Sweden are reluctant to long-term 
contractual commitments, meaning that price negotiations should take place every year and 
both parties (in particular, this is important for the growers because the production is typically 
more important in their business portfolio than the agro-biofuel is to the power plant) can 
cancel the contract if circumstances fundamentally change.  
 
The degree of cost control is preferably worked out on an individual basis with the farmer 
(unless this conveys unacceptable costs), and could very well vary depending on the farmer 
category he/she belongs; farmers who are agricultural entrepreneur tend to favor selling at the 
gate, active farmers tend to favor selling at the edge of the field and inactive farmers tend to 
favor selling on the root.  
 
A solution could be to develop three different contractual models differing according to the 
degree of cost control desired by the grower. 
 
Figure 1-1 shows the conceptual contract model, where the red line indicates the proposed 
contract model for commercial production of energy crops.  
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Figure 10-1 Conceptual contract model applied to European commercial production of energy crops 
The price of agro-biofuel is preferably following biofuel prices. This is often a natural 
development since they are comparable products. As little manipulation of the markets as 
possible is an advantage in order to build up confidence for the agro-biofuel as a sustainable 
primary energy source.  
 
However, having a part of the price indexed to the price to the oil- and diesel price index split 
the risk of suddenly increasing transportation costs between the producers and fuel-users and 
seem to be a feasible contract element, based to what has been stated in interviews. Another 
option is to have recurring price negotiations, either on a regular basis or following drastic 
price changes for transportation. 
 
As a quality assurance measure for the fuel-user, it is reasonable that the price varies with the 
moisture content (i.e., quality) of the delivered product and that the “windfall revenues” from 
financial policy instruments applied over Europe or nationally, for example the European 
Trading Scheme, tax refunds on electricity or feed-in tariffs, be paid to the farmer as an 
incentive or “carrot”.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and problem statement 
 
Cultivation of energy crops on arable land (in this study referred to as agro-biofuel) is an 
alternative business activity for farmers who want to diversify their production portfolio and 
venture into new markets. In the 1990s, following a generous establishment subsidy and high 
expectations on the development of the market price of biofuel, about a 
thousand Salix-plantations (fast-growing willows) were established by 
Swedish farmers (SOU 2007:36). However, bad production experiences, 
volatile policies and low profitability had a few years later put an end to 27 
% of the plantations (Helby et. al, 2006).  
The fact remains however that renewable sources of primary energy are 
expected to play an important role in securing energy supply and 
sustainable development in the European Union in the future. By 2020, 
the share of renewable energy of the total energy consumption is to be 20 
% according to a proposal from the European Energy Committee, and the 
share of biofuels in the vehicle fuel mix 10 %, according to the European 
energy policy agreed upon in 2007. Today, bioenergy constitute 64 % of the renewable energy 
supply in the Union, and 4 % of total domestic energy supply. The supply of biofuel in the 
Union is expected to double by 2010 (Swedish Energy Agency, 2008; European Commission, 
2008).   
“Farmers are 
not married to 
cereals. If there 
a buyers, there 
will be 
growers.”  
– former hemp-
grower in 
Skåne, Sweden 
Primary bioenergy sources of agricultural origin (in this study referred to as agro-biofuel) 
constitute about 35 % of the existing bioenergy resources in Europe and can thereby 
contribute largely to secure the expected doubling of supply of biofuel (Swedish Energy 
Agency, 2008). Examples are short rotation woody crops like Salix (harvested every 3-4 years), 
grass crops like hemp, miscanthus and reed canary grass or straw, a byproduct from cereal 
production.  
Currently however, the interest from farmers to grow energy crops on cropland is hardly 
overwhelming. A survey by Paulrud et al (2007) show that there are significant barriers to the 
uptake of these energy crops, including real and perceived production- and market risks. 
Other barriers are personal preferences and values, for example that arable land should be 
used for production of food (Paulrud et al, 2007; Helby et al, 2006). In order to stimulate 
increased production of energy crops, the real and perceived risks must be reduced, via the 
design and implementation of risk reduction measures. Such risk-reduction measures are 
described by Rosenqvist and Peck (2008) for the case of Salix, and include modeling of new 
contractual arrangements between producer and fuel-user. This type of risk reduction tool is 
intended to reduce the perceived market risk by providing security to the farmer that the 
product will get sold, perhaps even for a fixed price or for a price indexed to another product 
for which the farmer feels certain that the price development will be to his advantage. 
According to the Paulrud et al (2007), 39 % of farmers are today reluctant to grow energy 
crops due to expected low profitability, suggesting that the market risk is perceived as 
significant. A new contractual arrangement can be a valuable tool to reduce this risk 
perception and is therefore the focus of this thesis. 
1 
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However, the perception of risks associated with biofuel production have not been sufficiently 
delineated and evaluated. This is necessary to understand the potential of various new 
contractual forms for commercial production of agro-biofuel and this is therefore the first 
task of this work.  
1.2 Purpose and objectives 
 
This study will look closer on the potential for different contractual forms between 
commercial producers and users of agro-biofuel, with the purpose of reducing the risk 
perceptions associated with agro-biofuel. The objectives are the following:  
? Delineate the real and perceived risks associated with commercial production of 
agro-biofuel in Sweden, France and Finland  
? Investigate the preferences and expectations of producers and users of agro-biofuel 
in Sweden, France and Finland with regards to contractual arrangements 
? Propose a contract model with potential to reduce risk perceptions associated with 
agro-biofuel production and use in Sweden 
 
1.3 Research questions 
 
The overarching research question is: 
How is a contractual arrangement with potential to reduce risk perceptions for 
commercial agro-biofuel production designed? 
The two sub-questions are: 
1 What are the real and perceived risks associated with agro-biofuel 
production and use? 
2 What are the preferences of producers and fuel-users regarding 
contractual arrangements? 
 
1.4 Scope and boundaries 
 
This study is looking closely at the commercial systems of agro-biofuel production in Sweden, 
which is the focus country, and on a more shallow level in France and Finland. These 
additional country studies are mainly intended to enrich the work and provide additional 
inputs for achievement of the objectives. The interviews have been conducted in the counties 
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of Skåne, Uppland, Södermanland and Västra Götaland in Sweden, in the regions of Centre 
and Normandy in France and the central part and Ostbotnia in Finland.  
Producers (farmers) and fuel-users (heat- and power plants) are the principal interview objects, 
but other stakeholders such as intermediate buyers (Agroenergi), agricultural advisors, 
researchers and experts have also been interviewed. In France, no fuel-users were interviewed 
due to time constraints and the low availability. Bical (intermediate buyer) did not agree to be 
interviewed. 
Within this work, energy crops refer exclusively to non-edible crops whose main function is 
for energy production, and thus cereals or oilseed used for biofuel production are not 
included. The energy crops studied are Salix and hemp in Sweden, miscanthus and switchgrass 
in France and reed canary grass (RCG) in Finland (these crops are classified by the European 
Union as energy crops which makes the farmer eligible for the energy crop aid of 45 Euro/ha). 
Risks include the production risks, i.e. technical or biological risks associated with growing the 
energy crop, and the market risk, i.e. lack of markets or insufficient revenues due to a low 
market price of the product or a high market price for production inputs. The political risk is 
also assessed as a sub-component to the market risk. The risk categories are investigated in the 
light of their implications on the economic result for the farm business from the energy crop 
production/the heat- and power plant from the use of the energy crop as a fuel.  
Real risks are for example risks that can be verified by an objective source, for example an 
external advisor or expert. Perceived risks are such risks that the producer of fuel-user might 
believe exist because he/she is misinformed or lack knowledge and experience of energy crop 
production and use, and are thus mainly existing “in the person’s mind”. 
 
1.5 Project context and limitations 
 
This work is a part of the project “Agro-bioenergy in Europe: Reduction of Risk Costs for 
Energy Crops” carried out by the following Bioenergy NoE partners: the International 
Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics (IIIEE) in Sweden, INRA (Institute 
National de la Recherce Agronomique) in France, VTT Technical Research Centre in Finland, 
EC Renewable Energy Centre in Poland and Aston University in the UK. The objectives of 
the project are the following:  
1. review the theoretical underpinning for a range of interventions to reduce real and 
perceived risk associated with energy crops 
2. delineate risk perceptions for bioenergy crop production that are emerging among 
stakeholders in the field of practice 
3. assess the relative potential for new or novel “crop-production contractual forms” to 
achieve risk cost reduction 
For this particular piece of work INRA and VTT have played important roles. Research 
exchanges with these institutes were organized in order to compare the situations in Sweden, 
France and Finland. Twelve in-depth interviews with energy crop producers in France were 
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conducted between the 23rd of June and 3rd of July with the help of Geraldine Bocqueho, at 
INRA in Grignon. Teuvo Paappanen at VTT in Jyväskylä, Finland, organized eight in-depth 
interviews with energy crop producers and three interviews with fuel-users between August 
18th and 22nd. Both researchers assisted with translation during interviews. 
Thus this thesis is building on an already defined problem, for which the theoretical basis 
(objective 1) has been outlined within the study by Rosenqvist & Peck (2008). However, the 
scoping, planning and execution of this work has been the responsibility of the author. The 
first supervisor of this thesis, Philip Peck, has borne the responsibility for institutional 
arrangements required to facilitate this study, and for the financial support for the work.  
The geographical areas in which the research has been conducted in the respective countries 
were chosen based on different criterias; in Sweden, the regions with largest production (in 
hectares) of Salix and hemp were investigated, whereas in France the availability of contact 
details and data on producers determined the region and in Finland the geographical distance 
from the starting point in Jyväskylä. Interviewees have been found via Agroenergi, Bical, 
Chambre d’Agriculture, VTT, researchers at IIIEE and the Swedish University of Agricultural 
Sciences. This study is thus not presenting any statistical results, and is based on in-depth 
interviews with a small sample.  
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2 Situation description 
 
This chapter gives a background to the commercial energy crop production in Sweden and 
provides an overview of the situation for energy crop production in France and Finland.  The 
European policy environment for energy crop production is also described. 
2.1 Energy crop production in Sweden 
2.1.1 Potential and actual production 
 
Biofuel contributes to 19 % of total energy supply in Sweden, or 116 TWh. The dominating 
biofuel source is forestry products, but about 1 %, or 1,5 TWh, have agricultural origin. Crops 
for energy production are planted on about 70 000 ha of the approximately 2.7 million ha of 
arable land in Sweden (SOU 2007:36), including grain and oil plants.  
Table 1-1 shows the areal distribution of the different energy crops. Apart from the 
production of vehicle fuel like ethanol and biodiesel (mainly RME), the energy crops are 
primarily used in district heating plants, for combined heat- and power production and for 
small-scale use in domestic boilers (normally requires the raw material to be transformed into 
briquettes or pellets).  
Table 2-1 Areal distribution of energy crops in Sweden 
Crop Produced energy carrier Area of plantations (ha) 
Wheat Ethanol 25 000 
Oat Heat 5000 
Straw Heat By-product from cereal 
production 
Oil plants Biodiesel 25 000 
Salix Heat 14 000 
Reed canary grass Heat 600 
Grass Biogas 300 
Sum  70 000 
Source: SOU 2007:36 
The Swedish Bioenergy Association (Svebio) estimated in 2004 the potential for agro-biofuel 
in Sweden to 23 TWh/year. Similar calculations were made by the Swedish E.P.A in 1997 (28 
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TWh/year), Lantmännen in 2006 (29.65-36.5 TWh/year) and the Association of Swedish 
Farmers in 2007 (22 TWh/year). These calculations are however based on potentially available 
land area (500 000 – 600 000 ha, and in Lantmännen’s estimation up to 1 million ha). In the 
Swedish decision on agricultural policy in 1990 it was assumed that around 800 000 ha would 
be available for other production than food production, and of this the Biofuel Committee in 
1992 determined that 250 000 – 330 000 could be used for biofuel production (SOU 2007:36).  
The realistic potential of energy crop production is probably much lower than these 
estimations, when taking into account economic viability and preferences of farmers etc. 
(Swedish Energy Agency, 2008). According to Paulrud et al, (2007), almost 40 % of the 
farmers are today not interested in growing energy crop due to low expectations on 
profitability, a dislike of crops that are more than 4 meters high and the long-time 
commitment associated with investment in a plantation with long lifetime (in the case of Salix, 
with a plantation lifetime of 20-25 years).  
 
2.1.2 Development of energy crop production 
 
Apart from cereals dedicated to ethanol or heat production, Salix is the most widespread 
energy crop on Swedish arable land and has been cultivated since the 1980’, mainly in Skåne 
and Mälardalen. Most new plantations were established in the first half of the 1990’s when a 
substantial establishment subsidy was given to the growers as an action by the Swedish 
government to promote renewable energy sources. The deregulation of the agricultural market 
in 1991 had also caused the cereal prices to drop and the Swedish agricultural policy was going 
through a reform encouraging alternative business activities such as agro-bioenergy 
production (SOU 2007:36). Another attractive feature of the Salix-plantations was the low 
labor-intensity, which frees up time at the farm. 
About 1200 farmers established Salix-plantations at this time, and the expectations were high 
on the new crop. Unfortunately however, they were to a large extent unfulfilled. Harvest yield 
turned out low due to lack of production know-how and vulnerable crops, the policies were 
volatile and unreliable and most importantly, the expectations on the price development for 
bioenergy had been be overly optimistic (Helby et al, 2006). Moreover, a floor price for cereals 
accompanied the EU entrance and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and grain prices 
eventually started to recover. The interest in Salix leveled out, and a few years later it was 
shown that 27% had terminated the plantations, long before the plantation lifetime was over, 
and 25% regretted planting Salix at all (Helby et al, 2006). 
Figure 1-1 shows expectations on the uptake of Salix by the Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Biofuel Commission and the Federation of Swedish Farmers for 2010 
and 2020, juxtaposed against the actual plantations established until 2005. 
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Figure 2-1 Expectations on Salix plantations in Sweden 1989-2020 
Graph by Peck, 2006. Source: Helby et al., 2006 
 
Reed canary grass and hemp are marginal crops that in 2006 had been planted on 
approximately 500 and 600 ha respectively, as seen in Table 1-1. As these crops are planted 
and harvested annually, these figures can however fluctuate greatly from one year to another 
and for example be influenced by weather conditions and price of alternative crops, such as 
the cereal price.  
2.1.3 Policy environment  
 
EU policies and regulations are in addition to national policy schemes affecting the production 
of agro-biofuel in Europe. In particular, the regulations and subsidies under the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) play a central role.  
In 2007, the European Council agreed on an energy policy including targets of 20 % 
renewable energy of the EU domestic consumption as well as 10 % biofuels of the gas- and 
diesel consumption in 2020. This had been preceded by the European Common Climate 
Programme (ECCP) including Directive 2003/03/EC on the promotion of the use of biofuels 
(5.75 % blend of biofuels in the European consumption of transport fuel by 2010) and 
Directive 2007/77/EC on Electricity Production from Renewable Energy Sources.  
The Swedish Riksdag agreed on proposition 2005/06:172 in 2006, which included targets of 
25 % reduction of emission of greenhouse gases in 2020 compared to 1990 and Swedish 
independence of fossil fuels for transport and heating in 2020. Other important policy 
instruments assumed to have favored renewable energy over fossil fuels are high energy- and 
carbon taxes (The Swedish Government, 2008). 
Farmers producing agro-biofuel is entitled to 45 Euro/ha in energy crop aid, however for a 
maximum of 2 million ha in total within the Union. In 2008, the actual amount was 30 
7 
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Euro/ha (VTT). In order to receive this subsidy, the grower must have a contract with a 
buyer. 
Farmers are also entitled to the Single Farm Payments or the Single Area Payments regardless 
of whether they produce food crops or energy crops. These subsidies are one order of 
magnitude larger than the energy crop aid, but since they are crop-neutral, they are sometimes 
disregarded in economic calculations for production costs and profitability of agro-biofuel. 
Production costs calculations by Rosenqvist for energy crop production in Sweden (Appendix 
A) do not consider the crop-neutral subsidies, and neither do Agroenergi when calculating the 
profitability potential of Salix (Appendix B). However, calculations by VTT for production 
and delivery cost of RCG in Finland take all subsidies received by the farmer into account 
(Appendix [later]). Subsidies received by the Finnish farmers (with implications on the risk 
perceptions, as will be shown) are seen in detail in appendix D and can serve as an example of 
the subsidization of agricultural businesses producing energy crops.         
Salix-plantations have been subsidized with 10 000 SEK/ha in Sweden since the beginning of 
the 1990s, and an additional 4000 SEK/ha for fencing if needed.  It was reduced to 5000 
SEK/ha in 1997, in connection with Sweden entering the EU. At its peak, about 16 000 - 
19 000 hectares of Salix had been planted (this figure varies between sources) a figure that was 
later reduced and currently is at 14 300 ha (Swedish Energy Agency, 2008).  
The fluctuating subsidy level for Salix illustrates the volatility of energy- and agricultural 
policies in the past. Such volatility will lower the stakeholders’ confidence in the policys and 
could therefore have implications on the decisions on production activity, in particular for 
plantations with long lifetime. Other policys that have changed are the requirement for set-
aside land, abolished in 2007, which potentially have implications for energy crop production 
as energy crops were in fact allowed on the set-aside land. Moreover, the 45 Euro/ha energy 
aid subsidy is currently being revised by the European Commission (2008).  
Hemp as such was forbidden to grow by Swedish law until 2003, when industrial hemp 
became legal. In 2007, about 30 species became legal energy crops, and also entitled to the 
European energy crop aid (Agroväst and Swedish Board of Agriculture, 2006). 
The European Trading Scheme (ETS), which puts a price on CO  emissions by obligating 
emitting industries to purchase emission rights to a price determined on the market for such 
emission rights, can also affect the development of agro-biofuel systems. This is in the context 
of this study best illustrated by the production of RCG in Finland, which in many plants is 
replacing peat. Peat is not considered a renewable energy source by the EU, and when 
replaced by a renewable source the amount of emission rights the plant is forced to purchase 
is reduced, increasing the competitiveness of RCG over conventional fuels (in fact, as will be 
shown the profitability of growing RCG in Finland is for the grower closely related to the 
price of ETS emission rights in Europe). 
2
 
2.1.4 Markets 
 
Agroenergi AB (a company within the farmer cooperative Lantmännen Group) is buying the 
majority of the volumes of Salix chips produced in Sweden and delivers to about 20 district 
heating plants. Agroenergi is thus a middlehand between the producer and fuel-user. Annual 
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delivery contracts are applied but the possibility of long-term contracts up to 10 years is being 
evaluated (Larsson, S., interview May 2008). 
Agroenergi is also conducting R&D for Salix clones, and has so far developed 24 types of 
which about 10 are in commercial production. The company is also adminstrating the 
harvesters in Sweden (which has led to accusations of preserving a monopoly situation). 
According to the company (May 2008), there are seven fully equipped machines in total in 
Sweden. The few machines make the harvesting system vulnerable and inefficient, and the 
situation creates a bottleneck in the production chain. However, the investment cost for the 
special machinery required for the harvest is too high for an individual farm, although there 
are agricultural entrepreneurs who have developed their own harvest machines (Rosenqvist 
H., interview March 2008).   
The market for Salix-chips is of regional character as cost- and energy efficiency reasons put 
constraints on the reasonable transportation distance. The district heating plants are preferably 
located within 50 km from the producer and maximum at 100 km distance (Slagbrandt R., 
interview August 2008).  
Hemp is a relatively new crop and the markets are emerging. Growers today are often 
producing briquettes of the raw material and sell small scale and locally for home heating 
purposes (a consequence of this is that they not always make use of the energy crop aid of 45 
Euro/ha. The money received for 1-2 ha does not justify the work hours put down for the 
rather complicated application process and there are often no contracts in place which is a 
requirement for the subsidy). However, the hemp fibers can in fact be used in various 
industries such as pulp&paper, construction, furniture and textile which opens up many 
potential markets as long as the fibers can be separated to a reasonable cost, which means that 
there must be significant volumes produced in order to justify investment in the required 
machinery. The byproduct from hemp fiber production could then be used as agro-biofuel, 
and in fact separation of the fibers improves the combustion properties of the plant 
(Jacobsson T., interview June 2008) 
2.1.5 Cost structure and profitability  
 
Production costs vary significantly between crops (see appendix A). For example, the cost of 
production of Salix was in 2006 calculated to be 134 SEK/MWh and for hemp 269 
SEK/MWh, by Rosenqvist (2006). In the case of hemp, the solution to the high production 
cost is to make a value-added product such as briquettes and sell in small quantitites to local 
buyers, which means that the price received can be 3-4 times higher than if sold in bales to 
heat- and power plants. 
As such, the risk-averse nature of businesses implies that the growers and users of the new 
crop will require something tangible in return for the risk (potential of experiencing lower 
economic returns and also the uncertainty and discomfort involved) they take when growing 
an energy crop, for example higher profits than for a conventional business activity (Peck & 
Rosenqvist, 2008).  According to Rosenqvist (2008) the cost of growing the energy crop 
includes not only the actual production cost and alternative cost of land (rising significantly 
with the increase in cereal price in 2008) but also the cost of risk. The detailed calculation in 
2006 indicates that the production cost (composed of the three cost elements discussed above) 
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was, expressed in 2006 Euro, about 14.4-18 Euro/MWh1  (1 GJ = 3,6 MWh) and as the price 
is at best in the same range, we are at break even and no risk premium is given to the grower.  
Figure 1-1 shows a cost structure for cultivation of willows in Sweden 2006, developed by 
Rosenqvist and Nilsson (2006) as an example of a cost distribution for an energy crop. 
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Figure 2-2 Cost structure for a Salix-plantation in Sweden 
Source: Rosenqvist & Nilsson, 2006 
 
However, according to Rosenqvist and Nilsson (2006), the cost of producing energy crops can 
be reduced by 20-25 % before 2020 which would make the energy crops more competitive on 
the bioenergy market as well as compared to cereal crops as business activity. Salix, hemp, 
miscanthus and reed canary grass has respectively a 32 %, 12 %, 18% and 15 % production 
cost reduction potential compared to cereals according to Rosenqvist (2006). An important 
factor for reducing production costs is to increase volumes produced, as a larger production 
system make investments seem safer and economies of scale can be obtained. 
2.2 Overview of energy crop production in France 
 
In France there are 18 million hectares of cropland (FAO, 2008). Energy crops are very 
marginal - according to Bical, the leading bioenergy-producing company operating in France 
there are 1 300 ha of miscanthus planted in the country (focus product for the company). 
Other energy crops grown in France include switchgrass, approximately 60 ha in 2008, 
popplar on 170 ha, eucalyptus on 140 ha and Salix on about 90 ha (INRA, 2008).  
                                                 
1 The uncertainty of the last two years with rapidly rising cost for all agricultural feedstocks make this out of date and almost 
impossible to revise just now 
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Bical is a UK company that is, according to the company website, Europe’s largest developer 
and commercial producer of miscanthus, with production in Ireland and France and business 
across Europe and USA. They provide planting material (rhizomes), and sign non-binding 
purchase contracts with the farmers. The contracts stretch over 7 years, which means 5 
harvests because during the first two years the crop cannot be harvested. The miscanthus is 
sold as agro-biofuel or as animal bedding. 
The demand from the energy-producing companies is still quite low, not least because of the 
oversupply of cheap nuclear power in France and the general absence of district heating 
systems. To some extent the demand is created by the farmers themselves by initiation of 
projects for renewable energy production, as for example an on-going project in Indre-et-
Loire in a local heating plant, and use of agro-biofuel for fodder dehydration.  
The Chamber of Agriculture (Chambre d’Agriculture), public centres for agricultural research, 
advice, product development, projects etc. that exist in each region and each department with 
a main office in Paris, is also a potential driver of projects involving agro-biofuel. One 
example of where the Chamber is getting involved is in the Indre-et-Loire project mentioned 
above. 
2.3 Overview of energy crop production in Finland 
 
There are some 2.3 million hectares of arable land in Finland. Half of this area is used for 
cereal production today, and one percent is used for reed canary grass (RCG), thus about 
20 000 ha (in 2007). The Ministry of Agriculture is aiming at increasing this share to 10-20 %, 
or about 170 000 – 230 000 ha, as a means of increasing the share of renewable energy in the 
national production. According to VTT (2008), 500 000 – 700 000 ha is in theory possible to 
dedicate to RCG.  
Salix is planted on approximately 10 ha for experimental reasons by the University of Joensuu. 
In those Northern conditions the yield is about 3-4 dry ton/ha (lower than in Central Sweden 
where yields are about 6-7 dry ton/ha and much lower than in Southern Sweden where yields 
can be up to 10-12 dry ton/ha) and could be used for local boilers run by the farmers 
themselves, a system under development in Finland (Villa, A., interview August 21).  
Vapo Oy (private company and largest supplier of biofuel in Finland) and Pohjolan Voima Oy 
(PVO), which is a group of power plants, are the largest buyers of RCG. Both buyers have a 
standardized contract for RCG producers, included as Appendices E and F respectively. The 
price is among other factors based on the distance to the fuel-user, the moisture content and 
the price of CO in the European Trading Scheme. Production and harvesting costs as 
calculated by VTT are included in Appendix C.  
2
In 2006, more than 20 Finnish power plants were using RCG in the fuel mix (in total 21 
GWh), but more than 100 power plants are in fact able to use grass and straw for heat 
production (with maximum 15 % RCG of the total energy value of the fuel to avoid technical 
problems like sintering). The optimal situation is that the producer is located not more than 60 
km from the fuel-user, for energy- and cost efficiency reasons.  
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3 Analytical framework 
 
This chapter gives an explanation of the theories and concepts related to risks and contracts 
applied in this work.  
3.1 Risk theory 
 
The analytical framework of this thesis builds upon the summary paper on risk theory by 
Rosenqvist & Peck (2008). The paper was produced as a basis for the Bioenergy NoE project 
within which framework this thesis has been produced. At the time of publishing of this work, 
this paper is available as an IIIEE “working paper” on www.iiiee.lu.se. Additional sources are 
also used. 
3.1.1 Introduction to risk theory 
 
According to Rosenqvist & Peck (2008), most (if not all) business owners display aversion to 
risk, implying that reduction of risk has an economic value. Reducing risks associated with 
energy crop production will thus reduce the projected income from the production required 
by the farmer to take a decision to invest in it. This basic assumption is the starting point for 
this entire work. 
3.1.2 Approaches to risk 
 
Milton Friedman and Leonard Savage formulated the theory of risk aversion, risk neutrality 
and risk proclivity in 1948. Being risk-averse means choosing an alternative with less risk but 
also less expected return over a higher risk with higher return. Risk proclivity implies that the 
decision-maker is prone to take the higher risk with higher potential profits, but at the same 
time will accept a yield that is lower than could be expected if the yield was certain (otherwise, 
he would not take the risk). Risk-neutral individuals base their decisions on the expected yield 
(Fleisher, 1990; Robinson & Barry, 1987).  
Risk-averse investors or business managers require a compensation for taking a risk, i.e., a risk 
premium in the form of additional economic return from the activity associated with risk. The 
premiums increase with risk or with the perception of risk (Sharpe, 1964), and also with the 
degree of risk-aversion (Fleisher, 1990, Robinson & Barry, 1987).  
The rational business approach to risk is to accept a collective risk that is in reasonable 
proportion to the expected income from the venture, meaning that the portfolio of business 
activities in theory should be optimized with respect to risk and return. Applied to agriculture, 
this means that the farmer should keep a business portfolio that yields the optimal relationship 
between return and risk. However, decision-makers often base their decision on experience 
instead of conscious risk assessments (Wålstedt, 1987).  
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As regards approaches to risk, it is however important to distinguish between situations in 
which individuals seek risk as an experience in itself and situations where choices made affect 
the activity from which the person is making a living – a person can both be purchasing 
insurance and enjoy playing lotto, and the displayed risk approach in the respective situations 
should not be confused (Andersson, 1978).   
 
3.1.3 Risk and uncertainty 
 
In contrast to situations involving risk, defined as a situation in which the probability of 
different outcomes of an activity are known, uncertainty implies that no such values of 
probabilities can be calculated. However, the border between risk and uncertainty is blurred, 
especially since it is a subjective matter to establish whether or not a probability value is in fact 
valid or not (Andersson, 1978). According to Rosenqvist (1997), it is largely impossible to 
determine objective empirical probabilities for new areas of agricultural production, but at the 
same time, according to Andersson (1978) it is largely impossible that sudden and large 
changes in the techniques of agricultural production will change due to the fact that 
production is based on biological processes.  
3.1.4 Distinction between real risks and perceived risks 
 
The difference between real and perceived risks is quite obvious, but needs to be clearly 
defined for this work. Real risks are risks whose existence can be verified by objective and 
independent sources with sufficiently underpinned data to do so, and can be verified by other 
objective, sufficiently informed sources. Perceived risks are results of insufficient or skewed 
information, excessive risk-aversion or subjective preferences of values associated with the 
risk-conveying activity. Thus, they are in a sense “present in the minds of the actors” and 
objective data underpinning their magnitude or even verifying their validity are more difficult 
or impossible to gather. 
3.1.5 “Safety first” or “Expected utility maximization” 
 
In tactical analyses, the decision-making rule of “safety fist” is to make sure that the result of a 
decision does not end up below a critical level. The rule of expected utility maximization 
implies that the decision-maker knows the amount of utility or satisfaction for each possible 
outcome of an active choice, and chooses the alternative for which the expected utility is 
largest. Implications of applying the expected utility maximization is that risk premiums 
become difficult to establish, because the utility functions are individual and vary over time 
(Rosenqvist & Peck, 2008). 
However, both alternatives have been criticized for being too limited, for example because 
factors that influence a decision not always can be expressed in monetary terms. These 
limitations mean that risk premiums become difficult to establish, since utility functions are 
individual, subjective and change over time (Fleisher, 1990). 
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Another important aspect is that individuals tend to say one thing in a test environment but 
act differently in a real situation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
 
3.2 Risks for agricultural businesses 
 
This section explains briefly the business risks relevant to this work, namely production- 
market- and political risks, applied to agricultural businesses specifically.   
3.2.1 Relative weight of agricultural risks 
 
According to a study by Wålstedt et al. (1992), 95 % of Swedish farmers with more than 50 ha 
cropping land consider the price risk to have major importance to their business, 85 % 
considered the political risk to be of major importance and 67 % considered the production 
risk of major importance when given a choice between major or minor (the gap to 100 % 
represents the respondees considering the respective risks of minor importance). 
3.2.2 Market risk 
 
Market risks includes price risk of product produced by the agricultural business and the price 
risk for products required for production, as well as the risk of having or not having a market 
on which to sell the products. If there is a risk that such market would not be available at the 
time of harvest, for example because of high import tariffs or sudden lack of demand for a 
controversial/outdated/outperformed product, this must affect the decision taken by the risk-
averse farmer. 
Price risk is the second most important risk for farmers with crop cultivation as main activity - 
the weather is the main risk - according to Patrick et al. (1985), (but the main risk for farmers 
relying on animal production). The price risk includes that the price received for the 
agricultural product is too low on the market, but also that the price of inputs required for 
cultivation (fertilizers, herbicides, soil preparation means, equipment and agricultural services 
from entrepreneurs) could be too high or volatile, and as such put the revenues from the 
cultivation at risk.  
Market risks can be reduced via for example collection of market intelligence, diversification 
into several markets, futures and hedging (Patrik et al, 1985). 
3.2.3 Production risk 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, according to Patrick et al (1985) the weather is the most 
significant uncertainty factor for farmers with cropping as main activity. Production risks, 
however, include all uncertainty surrounding the performance of a crop, as the biological risks 
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of fungi or diseases, frost, or wild animals eating the crop (Hardaker et al, 1997). Moreover, in 
this work the production risk will include technical risks, such as low equipment performance 
or physical difficulties associated with planting, management and harvesting of an energy crop. 
 
3.2.4 Political risk 
 
Policies implemented by national governments or international institutions like the European 
Union can be highly volatile and thus convey an uncertainty to the farmer, who will not know 
if the production means he/she is using will be outlawed the coming year or if there will be a 
reduction in subsidies given for a certain activity. One example is the requirement for set-aside 
land that was abolished in 2008. The agricultural sector is regulated in the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP).   
3.3 Risk management 
 
There are several recognized risk reduction methods for business risks, of which some are 
explained briefly below. 
3.3.1 Diversification 
 
Production risks are primarily reduced via diversification into several production activities 
(Patrik et al, 1985). 
Diversification into more than one activity, i.e. creating an activity portfolio, is a method to 
reduce the production- and market risk. A risk effective portfolio is a combination of activities 
involving risk that minimizes the spread of the expected result (Sharpe 1964, Wålstedt, 1987). 
Diversification is justified when the relationship between input and output of production units 
is linear, because it implies that economies of scale cannot be obtained (which would be in 
favor of specialization). However, diversification also incurs costs related to the learning 
process for a new activity (Robinson & Barry, 1987). 
Diversification can also mean diversifying into several markets, and is then focusing on 
reducing the market risk only. 
The level of risk for a portfolio is measured via co-variance, i.e., how the production activities 
covary, which is normalized by dividing the covariance with the standard deviations. The 
normalized variable is called the correlation coefficient and varies between 1 and -1, for which 
1 is complete covariance and -1 is no risk at all. Normally, the correlation coefficients vary 
between 0 and 1 (Wålstedt, 1987). This is explained at length in Rosenqvist and Peck (2008).  
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3.3.2 Futures and options 
 
As a means to reducing the price risk the farmer can buy futures and options on the 
commodity exchange market. This is common practice in for example North America for 
food- and agricultural products. It is currently not as common in Europe, although this 
alternative is being explored to cope with an increasingly deregulated food- and agricultural 
market in the EU.  
Futures and options are not the same thing as trading the physical harvest, but a transaction of 
papers through which the farmer at a time when the market price is high (although he is not 
yet about to harvest) can secure that he will get the same price and not a potentially lower 
price later on when he has a physical harvest to sell. The difference between a normal contract 
(a “forward” contract) which stipulates that the harvest will be sold to a certain price in the 
future, the “future” contract means that the farmer sells contracts that he later buys back 
instead of delivering the harvest. “Option” is a contract that enables the buyer to buy a 
“future” at a certain price at a certain time, i.e. the commodity is in fact the “future”.   
The way it works is that the farmer sells contracts on a commodity he later will harvest on the 
market for futures and options. If the price has fallen later on when he is about to sell the 
physical harvest, he will buy the contracts back to the lower price, i.e. he has made a profit. 
But at the same time the revenues from the physical harvest are lower than they would have 
been at the time when he bought the contracts, thus canceling out the profit. The net result is 
that the farmer is guaranteed the market price that was current at the time when he sold the 
contracts. If the opposite occurs and the price increases, the same net result follows upon the 
trade; farmer can sell the physical harvest to the higher price, but also have to buy the 
contracts back to a higher price than he sold them for and the two options thus brings the 
same result to the farmer.  
This benefit of the trade on the market of futures and options is the high predictability 
(Swedish Agency of Agriculture, 2008).    
3.3.3 Price indexation 
 
To increase the predictability of the price development for a certain good, the price can in a 
contract be indexed to the price of another good or index. For example, the price of agro-
biofuel could be linked to the price of wood chips, the price of the substituted crop, the oil 
price index or the consumer price index. Below, these indexes are explained further. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) measures the average price of consumer goods for a specific year 
in relation to a base year, and is a common type of national account. In Sweden, it is calculated 
by Statistics Sweden. It is based on price data (price of the goods/services) and weighting data 
(shares of expenditures as fractions of total expenditure covered by the index). Figure 2-1 
presents the CPI between 1994 and 2007, with 1980 as a base year. 
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Figure 3-1 Consumer Price Index in Sweden, 1994-2007 
Source: Statistics Sweden 
The oil price is, simply put, determined by the global supply and demand. Figure 2-2 shows 
the global oil price index between 1996 and 2008. As can be seen from the figure, it has rising 
sharply since 2007 and was rising or fluctuating strongly during the course of this work. 
 
Figure 3-2 Global oil price, 1994-2007 
Source: WTI 
 
Unlike the oil price, the price of biofuel has a quite regional character due to the limited 
possibilities to transport biofuel long distances to a reasonable cost. This is in particular true 
for biofuel in non-compacted forms, like chaff or bales. For long transportation the form of 
pellets is better, and there is extensive international trade for pellets. Still however, the price 
varies notably between countries and regions (Junginger et. al.). There is today no standardized 
biofuel index has been developed, determining the quality requirements etc. of the product.    
 Figure 3-3 shows the Swedish biofuel price development between 1994 and 2007.  
17 
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Figure 3-3 Price development of biofuel in Sweden, 1994-2008 
Graph by Olsson, 2008. Source: Swedish Energy Agency 
 
The price fluctuations between summer (with low heating demand) and winter (with high 
heating demand) are noticeable in the figure. The price of pellets and briquettes for heating 
purposes (dark blue) has been increasing substantially, while the price of wood chips for 
heating purposes (yellow) has had a slower price development. 
3.3.4 Contract growing 
 
Contract growing is a form of vertical integration. Vertical integration can be defined as “the 
process in which several steps in the production and/or distribution of a product or service 
are controlled by a single company or entity, in order to increase that company’s or entity’s 
power in the marketplace” (Investorwords.com), but for agricultural applications. In contract 
growing, a contract between the buyer (often a food producing company) and the producer is 
erected that regulates the conditions for the production on a rather detailed level, for example 
date of sowing, fertilizing, weed control and harvest. An example is Svenska Nestlé AB 
(Findus Integrated Growing), AB Felix and Foodia AB in Skåne, Sweden. Sugar is also 
produced in this manner, with the producing company Sockerbolaget and the growers jointly 
determining the amount to be produced for the Swedish market. (Nationalencyclopedin, 
2008).  The farmers’ influence on the production is thus limited, but on the other hand he is 
guaranteed a certain price for the product (unless the contracts stipulate an open price). 
Moreover, contract growing can – as in the case of sugar – regulated the volumes produced by 
a certain product and thus avoid overproduction. In the ideal case a partnership between the 
grower and the buyer (Fingrain, 2008).  
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3.4 Agricultural contracts 
 
In this section, a simple conceptual contract model applicable to this work is developed based 
on a previously developed model by Drescher (2000) for contract farming. Although the 
contract in this work is not targeting contract farming but the agreement between a producer 
and buyer of an agricultural product, the model is considered applicable to illustrate elements 
of a contract. 
 
3.4.1 Classification of agricultural contracts 
 
According to Drescher, 2000, contract farming is an agreement between a legally independent 
firm and a farmer for production of a commodity for a future market. One approach to 
classification of contracts was developed by Mighell and Jones in 1963 (Drescher, 2000), and 
distinguished between 1) market specification contracts, 2) production-management contracts 
and 3) resource-providing contracts. The basis for the classification is the portion of the 
supply chain it regulates; in the first contract type, parts of the risk and management functions 
are transferred to the contractor, and in the second type more of the management functions 
lie with the contractor. Resource-providing contracts are close to vertical integration, with the 
contractor providing important inputs and taking over the risks and management.  
3.4.2 Four-dimensional contracts 
 
According to Grossekettler (1978), Macneil (1981) and Williamson (1989), the four 
dimensions of a awareness (whether participants realize they coordinate their behavior), 
authority (to which extent coordination is caused by one party’s power to dictate contract 
conditions), duration (coordination of economic plans with a temporal relationship) and 
investment (whether or not specific investments are carried out by at least one of the 
participants with regard to the contract). 
Drescher (2000) uses degree of duration, degree of investment and degree of authority to 
build a three-dimensional conceptual model for agricultural contracts.  
 
3.4.3 Conceptual contract model 
 
The conceptual contract model for this work is based on the classifications of Mighell and 
Jones in 1963 and the conceptual model developed by Drescher in 2000, with adaptations to 
fit the context of this study. It is based on degree of duration, degree of cost control and 
degree of flexibility of the contract: 
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Figure 3-4 Conceptual contract model 
Degree of cost control is to what extent the producer is involved in the supply chain, i.e. a 
reverse vertical integration. This can range from contract growing (no cost control), selling on 
the root (low degree of cost control), selling from the edge of the field (medium high degree 
of cost control) to delivery to the gate (high degree of cost control). Contracts range from 
short-term (annual) to midterm (3-5 years) or long-term (>5 years) contracts, and the degree 
of flexibility is determined by the no of price renegotiations/year and how easily the contract 
can be denounced by either party, for example if circumstances fundamentally change.  
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4 Methodology 
 
4.1 Data collection: Literature Review 
 
The literature review that has been conducted on previous research in the field of commercial 
production and use of energy crops is relatively short, mainly because not much literature on 
the topic is available today. Statistical surveys over attitudes and characteristics of energy crop 
producers from Sweden and Finland have been studied as they give insights to the barriers to 
the uptake of agro-biofuel and a starting point for risk perceptions. Previous proposals for 
contractual arrangements and organization of the commercial system for energy crop were 
also studied because it is related to the expected outcome of this work. 
4.2 Data collection: Interviews 
 
In-depth interviewing has been the main method of data collection in this study. 55 interviews 
have been carried out with stakeholders in Sweden, France and Finland. The interviews are 
described in this section with regards to content, structure and sample selection.  
4.2.1 Interviewing as a research method 
 
Personal interviews instead of distribution of questionnaires allow for interaction between the 
researcher and the interviewee which is an advantage for the semi-structured interview when 
discussion around a topic is desired – such discussion often needs facilitation from the 
researcher.  Personal interviews can be conducted face-to-face or over a telecommunication 
medium, for example over the phone (Crano et al., 2002). In this work, it was determined 
early that face-to-face interviews on the site of cultivation or use of the agro-biofuel product 
would be the method applied, in order to create a setting in which the interviewee felt 
comfortable and the discussion could go in-depth into the topic without distractions. 
Moreover, this would facilitate additional knowledge building, for example demonstration of 
harvesting equipment or combustion techniques, and quantitative data such as harvest yields 
or energy content that the interviewee might have available on-site of production/fuel-use.  
4.2.2 Selecting the interviewees 
 
The interviews are not intended to give any statistical result and are mostly qualitative with the 
aim of delineating risk perceptions and feasibility of risk reduction options. Quantitative 
results in the form of cost data etc are sometimes provided based on the work of other 
researchers or data provided by interviewees. The sample of interviewees was selected based 
on the criteria of having planted energy crops or having considered planting energy crops at 
some point, but to the extent possible, the sample was steered to include famers with different 
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experiences and level of satisfaction with the decision to plant energy crops. The Salix-growers 
were moreover distributed evenly over Skåne and Mälardalen (Counties of Södermanland and 
Uppsala) based on statistical data that these are the main Salix-growing regions (Rosenqvist, 
interview August 2008). 
A few of the Salix-growers were found via Håkan Rosenqvist and Agroenergi, key informants 
during the first stage of the work. The interviewed farmers could then suggest other potential 
interviewees (utilizing the snowball effect).  Hemp-growers were found via the Swedish 
University of Agriculture and the same snowball effect as described above for Salix-growers. 
In France, contact information for miscanthus-growers was provided by Bical and Chambre 
d´Agriculture and in Finland by Vapo and Pohjolan Voima (PVO).    
4.2.3 Interview structure and questions 
 
The interviews were semi-structured with 15-25 pre-specified, both closed and open 
questions. On several, elaboration on the pre-specified questions or related topics brought up 
by the interviewee was consistently prompted in order to gain better understanding of the 
situation. The topics in the farmer interviews were structured according to the following (full 
question sheet is included in Appendix G):  
1. Role and importance of energy crop in the overall farm business 
2. Cost control, price indexes and preferences for contractual forms 
3. Attitude and perception of attitudes towards energy crops 
4. Risk perceptions associated with energy crop 
5. Information needs 
6. General farm data 
 
Interviews with fuel-users were structured according to the following (full question sheet is 
included in Appendix H): 
1. Role and importance of biofuel/agro-biofuel for plant production 
2. Price-setting options and preferences for contractual forms 
3. Risk perceptions for energy crop use 
4. Expectations on future demand for biofuel/agro-biofuel 
5. General company data 
 
Investigating potential contract models to stimulate commercial production of energy crops 
23 
4.2.4 Carrying out the interviews 
 
All except for two of the interviews with the growers have been face-to-face interviews, most 
often carried out on the location of the production. Duration ranged between 40 and 80 
minutes but in the general case around 60 minutes. Two interviews were carried out over the 
telephone. Apart from the pre-specified questions, the discussion was comprehensive on the 
farmers’ approach and experience of biofuel production, providing many inputs to a 
discussion on the topic and further insight into the farmers’ perception of the situation. 
The interviews with fuel-users were mostly face-to-face, with the exception of two interviews. 
Discussions were encouraged on relevant topics and thus information beyond the prepared 
questions was also obtained. 
The first two of the respective interviews made were considered pilot-interviews after which 
the question guidance sheets, enclosed as Appendix G and H respectively, were modified. 
However, the results from these interviews still apply and will be included in the analysis. 
4.3 Data analysis and interpretation 
 
This section explains how the results from the interviews and literature review are analyzed in 
order to draw conclusions from the work. 
4.3.1 Categorization of producers 
 
Categorization of farmers has the dual purpose of making each included farmer anonymous 
and at the same time distinguishing between the main farm/farmer types that might respond 
in a similar manner to new development in field of agro-biofuel (such as changed conditions 
or new policies).  
Three categories were developed by the author of this study, based on the level of importance 
of the agro-biofuel-production in the overall farm business and in fact as a consequence of a 
noted difference in how the farmers respond to the pre-specified questions within the three 
categories. The categorization is merely a finer breakdown of the results that can be applied if 
found convenient, and is not expected to make this study difficult to compare to other studies.    
The categorization into active or inactive farmers is supported by several actors in the field as 
for example Proagria in Finland (agricultural advisor) and X. The category of “entrepreneurs” 
was added because it was noted during interviews that farmers with entrepreneurial 
businesses, in particular associated with ownership of special machinery, changed the 
perceptions of risks and profitability associated with energy crop cultivation. 
Category 1: Entrepreneurial farmers 
Active farmers that in addition to farm production run an entrepreneurial business related to 
agro-biofuel production, for example harvesting or seed production. The share of total 
incomes originating from energy crop production/associated production activities is high. 
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Category 2: Active farmers 
Active farmers who live on conventional farm production, with energy crop cultivation in 
their production portfolio (but not as main production activity). The share of total incomes 
originating from energy crop production is a low to medium high.  
Category 3: Inactive farmers  
Part-time farmers with jobs outside the farm, or previously active farmers (for example 
retirees) whose only farm production is the energy crop. The share of total incomes that 
originating from the farm production and consequently from the energy crop production is 
low.  
4.3.2 Risk perceptions 
 
The identified risks will be classified as production- or market risks and described qualitatively. 
Identified risks that do not fall into the production- or market risk category (as they are 
explained in section 2.2) are not included in the analysis but will be perhaps be mentioned 
briefly, however in such cases it is stated that it is not within the scope of the paper but 
included because of relevance for other risks.  No further risk analysis or evaluation will be 
done, since insufficient quantitative data is available at this point.   
4.3.3 Preferences and expectations 
 
The interview data contains indications of preferences and expectations on price-setting 
schemes and contractual arrangements with fuel-users/producers respectively. Those 
preferences will be analyzed qualitatively to discern patterns or general preferences.   
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5 Results: Literature Review 
 
This section contains brief summaries of some relevant studies conducted in fields related to 
commercial agro-biofuel systems. Statistical studies of attitudes towards energy crops among 
farmers in Sweden and Finland are presented to help delineate some of the barriers associated 
with energy crop production, and some research on contractual agreements for commercial 
energy systems is presented to give a more solid background to the shaping of contractual 
agreements between producers and buyers of agro-biofuel. 
5.1 The business perspective 
 
A report produced by the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences in 2006 explores the 
business opportunities for straw fuel in the vicinity of Lund in Southern Sweden. Straw is a 
byproduct of cereal production and in fact not within the scope of this work, but this study is 
nonetheless considered relevant as it presents contractual models for commercialization of an 
agriculturally produced fuel for heat- and power plants (straw is in this case in competition 
with the energy crops investigated in this work as raw material for energy production). 
Lunds Energi AB is in focus due to the company’s planned investments in two new boilers, of 
which one is adapted to straw and grass fuels and the other for wood fuels, peat and recycled 
wood.  
Two models are investigated; one where the farmers individually negotiates contracts with the 
power plant and one where they form associations that deal with the negotiations and jointly 
with the logistics, such as storage, handling and transportation, via contractors. A combination 
is suggested by Lunds Energi, who is willing to negotiate with organizations of farmers, but 
prefer that there exist more than one such organization to negotiate with. They are not 
interested in buying the fuel at an earlier point than at the gate. These associations are similar 
to the farmers’ associations that are established institutions that negotiate price of 
conventional crops such as cereals and oilseeds for the agricultural businesses, and has a dual 
purpose of strengthening the negotiation power of the farmers and facilitating the negotiation 
process for both parties as fewer negotiations must take place, thus lowering transaction costs 
of contracts.  
Contracts are suggested two run over 2-3 years based on energy content and an index. The 
farmer organizations have contracts with contractors (for harvest, transport etc) for 2-3 years 
based on tonnage.  
In Denmark power plants have long experience of using straw for heat production. Previously 
there were so called Delivery organizations that organized deliveries and contracts with the 
power plants, but they were considered a barrier to free competition and were thus prohibited. 
The organizations were replaced by a system where the power plants search for fuel by ads in 
magazines, and producers can leave their offers. Annual contracts are written individually for 
each farmer. Point of sales is at the edge of the field, and moisture content (which should be 
as low as possible and not exceed 23 % more than patch wise) and bale dimensions are 
regulated in the contracts along with some quality requirements of the bales. The price is and 
Marie Kimming, IIIEE, Lund University 
established base price calculated for time of delivery (with an interest rate of 12 %) and 
moisture content. The price is varying on a monthly basis. 
 
5.2 Attitudes towards energy crop production 
 
Statistical studies of the farmers’ attitudes towards energy crops were included as they indicate 
potential risk perceptions associated with such crops.  
5.2.1 Sweden 
 
39% of the farmers in a survey by Paulrud et al (2007) stated “too low profitability” as the 
main reason for not growing bioenergy crops. According to Rosenqvist (interview, March 
2008), grains might be preferred over Salix even when the expected return is actually higher 
for Salix, for two reasons; firstly, the farmer is already accustomed to growing grains, and has 
the necessary skills, tools, machinery and work force. Secondly, the Salix-plantations require a 
long-term commitment, and farmers are generally looking at business from a short-term 
perspective. Therefore, a high profitability is not a guarantee for a switch to Salix plantations. 
Farmers with contractual agreements are according to Paulrud et al (2007) more likely to turn 
to energy crops than others, since such agreements provide an additional security that can fill 
the uncertainty gap many farmers face when turning to a new farm activity (or any business 
when trying a new business area). Having contracts in place for the crops are also the most 
common situation among farmers, especially for Salix (Håkan Rosenqvist, interview March 
2008). 
It is also shown by Paulrud et al that even though the expected return on the grown crop is 
influencing the willingness to grow energy crops, it does not matter whether the income is 
from the market price or from subsidies, as long as subsidies are considered reliable and long-
term. This suggests that as long as the farmers have confidence in the economic instruments 
used by policymaker, they will suffice to make up for a low or volatile market price. Another 
result from the survey is that the farmer is more likely to switch to an energy crop if existing 
machinery on the farm can be used for the new crop. Furthermore, the length of the rotation 
period of the crop has a linear negative relationship to the willingness to grow such crop, 
given the uncertainty following the consequential inflexibility (Paulrud et al, 2007). 
”I grow the worst 
forestry product on 
the best arable 
land”  
Moreover, the survey by Paulrud et al (2007) showed that 32% agreed with the 
statement “arable land should be used for food production” when asked for a 
reason not to grow energy crops. SOU 2007:36, shows that the negative attitudes 
towards energy crops as a replacement or competition to food production are 
disappearing. Important to note however, is that this study was conducted before 
the food prices rose to the highest level in 30 years in the first three months of 
2008 (World Food Organization, July 2008). To what extent the high food prices 
can be attributed to biofuel production substituting cereal farming is debated, but 
both the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the 
European Commission are putting it down as a contributing factor, although EC 
–Salix-grower in 
Södermanland, 
Sweden  
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highlights that the impact is of regional character – within the EU, biofuel affect 1 % of cereal 
production (European Commission, July 2008). 
The reluctance to grow other crops than crops for food production was most prominent 
among older farmers, but as shown above, the older farmers were also for other reasons not 
the most likely to grow willows or other energy crops and therefore, this will have a smaller 
impact on the total than if this preference was found among the middle-age farmers. (Paulrud 
et al., 2007). 
Many farmers are also reluctant to crops with a height of over 4 meters (high crops limit the 
view and changes the esthetical impression of the landscape), which does not speak in favor of 
Salix-crops. A Salix plantation should preferably be at some distance from the houses, which 
means that the smaller the farm, the lower is the probability that the farmer for the sake of the 
landscape will take up such a crop. (Paulrud et al, 2007). 
 
 
5.2.2 Finland 
 
VTT has performed as study of the willingness of Finnish farmers to grow energy crops. 
Results show a positive attitude, in particular towards RCG, and expectations of profitability 
and political support for energy crop production. Change of landscape is not a problem, 
although the majority still thinks that arable land primarily is for food production most also 
prefer energy crop to forestation of fields. 10 % are sure or pretty sure they will grow energy 
crops at some point, but 89 % would only do so if the profitability was the same or higher 
than with conventional crops. Active farmers with large farms are more interested than the 
average, just like young farmers with high education, more often men than women and often 
agricultural entrepreneurs.  
RCG is interesting as a crop because it can be grown on former peat land and harvested in 
spring when the work load is small on the farm. Oil crops are the second most favored 
alternative, but woody crops are not as popular and 75 % of farmers leasing out land would 
have restrictions for establishment of a woody crop, compared to 25 % for other energy 
crops.  
If not producing cereals, the most favored options for alternative land use is cultivation of 
grass-like energy crops, forestation and having set-aside land. 
5.3  Characteristics of Salix-growing farms in Sweden 
 
A statistical study of willow (Salix) growers and non-willow growers in Sweden by Rosenqvist 
et al. (2000) shows that there are a few things willow-growers have in common, that can help 
delineate a picture of the prerequisites for a farmer to choose such farm activity over other 
activities. The results are similar for Roos et al (2000), basing their study on a theoretical 
model for profit-maximization, but not fully consistent with the extensive survey based on the 
choice experiment-method performed by Paulrud et al (2007). However, while Rosenqvist and 
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Roos focus solely on farmers that in fact currently grow willows, Paulrud has examined the 
willingness to grow energy crops in general among farmers, regardless of current farm activity, 
including Salix, reed canary grass (RCG) and grains for energy production. The following 
analysis can therefore also provide insights as to how the willingness to grow Salix differs 
from the willingness to grow energy crops in general.  
In Sweden, a willow-growing farm has about 3 times the arable area of an average farm 
(Rosenqvist et al, 2000), a result that is contradicted by Paulrud et al (2007), saying that there is 
a negative correlation between willingness to cultivate energy crops and farm size. In other 
words, cultivation of Salix is favored by large farm area (which could be related to the height 
of Salix and subsequent wish to plant it far from the house) whereas energy crops in general 
are more interesting to small farms than large farms (small farms are perhaps more flexible 
because they possess a smaller machine park, thus have to appoint contractors for harvest etc. 
anyway).   
While the picture is somewhat mixed, Paulrud finds that farmers cultivating energy crops are 
normally found among the younger farmers. Rosenqvist and Roos put the willow-growers in 
the middle-age section (50-65), with the explanation that the middle-age farmers to a larger 
extent than younger have a stable financial situation, the security of many years of experience 
but at the same time are less prone to stick to old habits and preferences than older farmers.  
Forest growers are according to Roos more often willow-growers than others, which do not 
seem surprising at all as willows provide wood fuel, which the forest grower is already used to 
managing. However, Rosenqvists’ results suggest that the relative land use of willow growers 
and non-willow growers is practically identical (Fig 2., Rosenqvist 2000), except for the 
pastureland which constitutes a smaller share at willow-growing farms. This suggest, 
consistent with Roos’ findings, that farms with milk production and cattle are less likely to 
grow willows, probably a consequence of the need for such a farm to have pasture land and 
produce fodder. 
The quality of land is also of significance – Salix is more often grown on average-yield land 
than on the worst or best land. From a technical point of view, Salix and grains give the 
highest yield on the same type of land, but calculations show that it is more cost-effective to 
grow grains on the best land and Salix on average land (Roos). 
Leasing out of land is positively correlated with willow-growing (Roos, Rosenqvist), probably 
due to the fact that leasing is a consequence of a surplus of land (a large farm,) while the 
impact of tenancy is not as clear-cut.  
Institutional owners are more often willow-growers than other farmers (Roos, Rosenqvist), 
which could be due to the low labor-intensity of willow crops – it is likely that a large 
employer is more interested in cutting labor-cost than a family farmer (Roos).  
Willow-growers are most common in Örebro County, followed by the provinces of Uppland 
and Södermanland (especially around Lake Mälaren, a region referred to as Mälardalen), and 
least common in Småland, Öland, Gotland, southern part of Västergötland and Bohuslän. 
Skåne is somewhat average (Rosenqvist et al, 2000) but have a high percentage of other energy 
crops (Paulrud et al, 2007). 
The many willow-growers in the Örebro area is in part due to the high demand of wood fuel 
in this area, which has a quite extensive district heating infrastructure, and the average-level 
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grain yield, which has been shown to present the best conditions for willow growing 
(Rosenqvist et al, 2000). 
The study by Börjesson et al (2003) shows that 40% of the current Salix-growing farmers 
would consider keeping their Salix-crops because of the good hunting opportunities it 
presents.  
5.4 Previous proposals for contractual arrangements for Salix 
 
Helby et al (2004) proposes in the report “Market development problems for bio-energy 
systems in Sweden” that an incentive be paid to the district heating plants to encourage them 
to agree to long-term contract with growers. The idea behind is that the green certificate 
scheme that was about to be introduced in Sweden would not favour biomass over wind 
power and thus that the production development and markets for Salix would not have a 
chance to develop unless “protected” by a subsidy. Moreover, the assumptions is made that 
the growers benefit from long-term contracts because it relieves them from the price risk, 
whereas the buyers are more resistant to agree to such commitment and therefore require 
external support to enter such an agreement. This would bridge the gap between production 
cost and market price.  
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6 Results: Sweden 
 
This chapter contains the results from interviews with eleven Salix-growers and six hemp-
growers in the counties of Skåne, Uppland, Södermanland and Västra Götaland in Sweden. 
6.1 Growing Salix 
 
This section delineates the growers’ motivations for planting Salix and the level of satisfaction 
with this decision among growers. 
6.1.1 Why plant? 
 
With one exception, the Salix-growers 
interviewed for this study had established 
their plantations between 1989 and 1996 
(the exception was establishment in 2003).  
Two of the farmers had decided to plant 
Salix as a means of using the set-aside land, 
three had planted on land that for various 
reasons were tricky to plant cereals on 
(inconvenient location or proximity to 
forest that brought wild animals to the 
crop), one overtook a lease with Salix on 
(thus it was accidental), one planted Salix as 
the only feasible option to leasing the land to someone else due to retirement, for three the 
main reason was due to the low cereal prices, and one because he was optimistic about the 
price of wood chips.  
With the exception of one of the entrepreneurial farmers, the ones that had planted because 
the cereal prices were low somewhat regretted their decision today, with cereal prices booming 
in the first months of 2008. However, although the other farmers had more or less the same 
type and amount of complaints around the system for Salix-production in Sweden, if they had 
planted as an alternative to have fallow land, land with nothing on it or instead of leasing the 
land to someone else, all stated that they were satisfied with their decision regardless of if they 
had been profitable.  
 
 
6.1.2 Future of established plantations 
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Satisfied with their plantation or not, the only ones that in fact planned to keep their 
plantation were the entrepreneurial farmers (who were also the most profitable) and the 
inactive farmers for whom no other alternative existed. 
The active farmers (with one exception, a grower who had planted in 2003 and not yet 
harvested), were either uncertain as to whether they would keep the plantation or not planning 
to keep their plantation. For some this was due to the recent removal of the requirement for 
set-aside land, for some because they considered the price and profitability too low, in 
particular as the cereal price rose significantly in 2007 while the development of biofuel price 
has not met the expectations. This result is somewhat in line with the result from Helby et al 
(2006) who showed that in 2005, 25 % of farmers that had planted Salix in the 1990s regretted 
this decision. 
 
6.2 Risk perceptions 
 
This section is delineates the risk perceptions of Salix-growing. 
6.2.1 Production 
 
The harvest has proven to be a bottleneck in the system, partly because the heavy harvest 
machines in practice require frozen ground to operate (or the field might get damaged), partly 
because there are only seven of the Claas Jaguar harvesters required available in Sweden 
(Slagbrandt R., interview August 2008) and it was also suggested by a grower that the 
machines are standing still on the fields due to maintenance and refueling about 50% of the 
time, compared to for example a harvest machine for forestall wood chips that stand still 15 % 
of the time. The problem with harvest machines requiring frozen ground seemed in fact to be 
most severe in Uppland and Södermanland, due to the fact that although they are further 
north and have a colder climate than Skåne, they have barely seen frozen ground in the last 
ten years, whereas the farmers in Skåne are used to the fact that frozen ground only occur 
perhaps once every ten years and thus cannot rely on such conditions. 
Frost and fungi has also been problematic for some, reducing yields significantly at times. In 
particular the old clones are sensitive to the colder climate in Uppland/Södermanland. Wild 
pigs rooting around in the fields (wild pigs are frequent in Skåne) or elks that do not even let 
electric fences shut them out also ruins parts of the harvest at times, up to as much as an 
estimated 30 % for one farmer in Skåne. Yield is also dependent on the quality of soil planted 
on. 
6.2.2 Markets 
 
It was suggested by several producers that the market for Salix chips and most of all, for the 
production factors of Salix chips such as planting and harvesting, is distorted due to the 
“monopoly” situation of Agroenergi for the contracting of entrepreneurs. As a consequence, 
profits might be lost somewhere in the production chain where the producer lacks control or 
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lack the possibility of taking control, and normal market mechanisms like competition are out 
of play. 
According to farmers, their situation would have been different if they freely could choose and 
negotiate with the contractors to perform the harvest. It was also suggested during the 
interviews that Agroenergi is being too passive, do not communicate sufficiently with the 
growers, sometimes do not show up when supposed to and that they perhaps are not that 
interested in the product at all, since agro-bioenergy is a niche product in their portfolio.  
Another finding is that the producers do not have sufficient power towards the market to 
create a favorable situation for themselves, or the capacity to create knowledge that would 
make markets more transparent. For cereals or oilseeds, there are farmers’ associations that 
negotiate the product prices for the farmers – thereby the farmers have a far better negotiation 
position than if each one would negotiate individually. There is no such association for Salix 
(or energy crops), and therefore, each farmer is on his own to negotiate with the energy 
companies (unless they sell to Agroenergi), something that could prove difficult since they 
would be supplying very marginal quantities of fuel to the plant. A better organization around 
biofuel production could also create a platform for exchange of knowledge, experience and 
technical information, field trips etc, which was requested by some of the farmers. According 
to most of the interviewees, such a forum does not exist today.  
The risk of low economic returns is the most important risk for Salix-growers. As it seems, a 
common situation is that the farmer is close to the break-even limit for the investment, 
sometimes a bit below, sometimes a bit above. Sometimes the low profitability is in part due 
to low yield per hectare, which relates back to the production risks, or that the Salix was 
planted on soil of insufficient quality or badly managed. However, even farmers that planted 
on good soil, using the new, better clones (for example Tora) and were very careful in their 
management of the plantation were close to quitting their plantation if they would not get a 
better price for the Salix chips. 
6.2.3 Information needs 
 
Experience exchange and exchanging of production-related advice, for example via farmers’ 
associations or growers’ meetings, is desired by growers today. Also required is information 
regarding the market potential and financial information. Some also considered this 
information readily available via Agroenergi. Agroenergi and Rural Society of Economics 
(Hushållningssällskapet) were also most often mentioned as responsible for providing any 
kind of information regarding growing of Salix, and also the farmers associations, 
governmental agencies and even heating plants – today the heating plants are in competition 
with each other for fuel, but via cooperation between the plants they could possibly increase 
the uptake of Salix by marketing it more to potential growers.   
 
6.2.4 Barriers to the uptake of Salix 
 ”Burning food 
crops to produce 
energy is just lack 
of imagination”  
According to current growers of Salix, the reason that more farmers 
do not establish Salix-plantations relates to the lack of profitability. 
 
– Salix-grower in 
Södermanland, 
Sweden 
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Moreover, there are farmers that prefer to grow the conventional crops that they know well 
and also, to have more activity on the farm than the Salix-plantation requires. Unless the 
farmer is interested in hunting, there are no real benefits of Salix.  
Studies have shown that some famers have a dislike of growing other crops than food crops 
on arable land. The general opinion on this issue among the Swedish Salix-growers is however 
that both energy- and food is needed and that a balance between the two needs to be 
established, and also to await the future development on this matter. The soil must simply be 
used smartly, for example by not combusting the edible crops but the waste products. Also, 
according to one of the entrepreneurial farmers, 5-10% of the Swedish soil should be possible 
to use for energy crops without using the best soils (according to one of the successful 
growers soil of level 7 on a scale from 1-10 is optimal for Salix. Above that, the yield from 
cereals is too high to exchange for a woody crop, and below that, the soil quality is too low for 
cultivation of Salix).  
 
6.3 Contract preferences  
 
This section is based on the result of the interviews with Salix-growers and presents the 
preferences stated by the growers with respect to contractual forms and price-setting. 
6.3.1 Duration of contract 
 
Preferences on the duration of contract are quite individual, but only a couple of the growers 
stated that they would prefer a contract lasting over several harvests over annual delivery 
contracts. Notably, growers currently selling via Agroenergi with annual contracts preferred 
keeping their options open and await new actors on the market, to signing long-term 
contracts. On the other hand, entrepreneurial farmers selling directly to heating plants were 
interested in long-term contracts because it would facilitate planning. Given the low 
profitability experienced by many growers currently selling via Agroenergi, it is hardly 
surprising that those farmers would be the least interested in a long-term commitment. Also, it 
was stated by one grower that the long-term contract is not important as long as there is 
profitability.  
In fact, the stated preferences regarding long-term contracts suggest that the entrepreneurial 
farmers and the inactive farmers are the most risk-averse farmers and prone to the “safety 
first” approach to risk, i.e. committing to long-term contracts although the price might turn 
out lower. The active farmers on the other hand seem more ready to take risks in return for 
higher potential revenues, thus displaying the “expected utility maximization” approach. This 
could be explained by the fact that entrepreneurial farmers to a larger extent than the active 
farmers are dependent on the Salix-plantations for their living and therefore needs a certain 
level of security, whereas the inactive farmers simply want to take advantage of the low 
labour-intensity of the crop and have lower requirements on profitability.  
Regarding the possibility of receiving a deduction price each year for the plantation instead of 
the entire income every 3-5 years at the actual harvest, the interest was quite weak. For the 
small growers, this option is not relevant because the revenues are so small to begin with – in 
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fact, for some the revenues from one harvest is basically equal to the cost of fertilizer and 
weed control for the next generation of trees. For farmers with large Salix-plantations it was 
not deemed relevant because a large Salix-plantation will have rotating harvests and thus the 
problem of lack of cash flow will not appear in the first place. Large farms are also liquid from 
other production activities. The intermediate-sized plantations/farms did not reject the option, 
but the risk of not being able to deliver the expected amount at the year of harvest and the 
possible consequences of that was mentioned as an issue for such contracts.  
The general impression is that the farmers are not concerned about even cash flows as long as 
the activity is profitable, and moreover that they are used to volatile conditions that do not 
favor long-term planning, or even make the long-term contracts more of a gambling than not 
having a contract at all.    
6.3.2 Price indexations 
 
Most farmers considered the energy crop a product to be competing with other sources of 
energy on the energy market, rather than a product to be compared to cereals. Probably, the 
energy market was the market they had in mind when planting Salix, particularly as many took 
the decision in order to diversify in a time when cereal prices were low. In particular, the 
entrepreneurial farmers wanted to venture into the energy market, whereas a couple of the 
active farmers in fact stated an interest in a price indexed to cereals (in particular those who 
had planted Salix instead of cereals). An index based on both cereal prices and energy prices 
was also suggested by several farmers.  
Some farmers were concerned that linking the price of biofuel to conventional energy sources 
like oil, coal or gas would eliminate the competitive advantage of biofuel, in particular when 
the price of oil is high. Although taking this into account when balancing the price and with 
the carbon taxes differentiating the end price of biofuel and conventional fuel to the 
advantage of the former, a biofuel price linked to the profitability index for cereals avoids this 
potential problem altogether because the price would follow a different curve – most 
interviewed growers believed that the fuel prices in general (both fossil fuels and biofuels) 
would continue rising whereas the cereal price would not (at least not to the same extent), and 
thus agro-biofuel could become an attractive alternative at the same time as the comparisons 
between the two production activities would be easier for the farmer. However, this reasoning 
assumes that the biofuel prices in general increase significantly, or the profitability of the 
grower would be compromised. A detailed analysis of potential profitability at various cereal- 
and biofuel price levels is out of the scope of this paper. 
6.3.3 Futures and options 
 
The market of futures and options is emerging in Sweden, but many farmers still consider it a 
bit risky and dangerous to get into such business, largely due to the risk of not having enough 
harvest to deliver in the end, which means that they will lose money if there is a price increase 
after they have sold the contracts on the harvest. Moreover, not everyone is interested in 
“gambling” because it is too difficult to predict the price fluctuations. Those who secure the 
price of their conventional crops might also do it for the energy crop but generally there is 
insufficient experience with this market.  
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6.3.4 Contract growing 
 
Contract growing seems to be an option for those who planted because they did not want to 
have much activity on the farm, for example the inactive farmers. For the rest, the idea was 
not completely rejected as a potential option, and one of the entrepreneurial farmers even 
suggested it without being prompted as a potential for increasing the uptake of Salix among 
farmers. However, one farmer mentioned that it was hardly any point to have such a system, 
because of the small amount of work required. 
6.3.5 Preferred point of sales 
 
As has been indicated, the entrepreneurial farmers sell Salix chips at the gate to the power 
plants, and the inactive farmers on the root. Among the active farmers there was a noticeable 
preference towards selling from the edge of the field – assisting during harvest, for example by 
driving a second side-wagon to the harvesting machine to prevent it from standing still while 
the first was being emptied, reduces the cost. One active farmer, who was particularly 
unsatisfied with his crop and thus perhaps the least dedicated one, sold on the root. (One 
active farmer sold at the gate, but an important difference is that he was not selling to 
Agroenergi or a heating plant, but to a neighbor.) The farmer who had yet not harvested had 
not made up his mind, but would possibly harvest himself (5 ha) and in any case sell to the 
local community in small batches (i.e. which the customers picked up themselves), and there 
was thus no issue of transportation.  
Generally, the result indicates that entrepreneurial farmers prefer to integrate far into the 
production chain, the active farmers preferred to integrate as far as to the harvest but leave the 
transportation up to the buyer, and the ones that were more engaged in work outside the farm 
than on the farm preferred to let the buyer integrate as far as possible into the production 
chain.    
6.4 Growing hemp 
 
This section is explaining the reasons among interviewees for growing hemp. 
6.4.1 Why plant? 
 
The most important motivation for 
growing hemp is diversification; 
cereal growing had for many years 
delivered low profits and at the 
same time, energy prices had 
started to rise. However, apart 
from the business perspective there 
are also farmers that are looking 
for change for the sake of change 
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itself. Also, the possibility of making something of the set-aside land was a reason for one 
grower, and the hunting opportunities tempted some.  
In essence, the impression from the six interviews with hemp-growers is that there is a 
fundamental difference from the Salix-growers; the hemp-growers have taken the decision to 
grow hemp very consciously with full awareness of that they are “on their own” without 
advisors (the experience of growing hemp is not plentiful in Sweden), guaranteed buyers or 
even established harvesting- storing- andtransportation techniques. They are on the very front 
edge of the development, maybe even too much in the front for their own good.  
As a result, they now face a high market risk because the markets are still developing. At the 
same time, if the market development is good they will reap the benefits of already being 
established producers. This makes the hemp-growers more of entrepreneurs and 
“businessmen” than the Salix-growers; and as will be discussed at length further on marketing 
and exposure to potential buyers seem to be the most important risk reduction measure.  
 
6.5 Risk perceptions 
 
This section is delineates the risk perceptions of hemp-growing. 
6.5.1 Production 
 
The hemp can in theory be harvested in November–December, but this requires a few days of 
temperatures below zero (to freeze-dry the plant, after which the nutrients have returned to 
the soil and there will be less problems with sintering in the combustion chamber). Frosts are 
not that common to occur in Skåne. If the hemp stands over winter, heavy snow could weigh 
it down to the extent that it is no longer possible to get a decent harvest with the techniques 
available today. Common practice is to harvest in spring, in March-April.  
The required dryness of the material at harvest is a factor that in fact makes the hemp 
production according to growers more weather-dependent than cereals (normally dried after 
the harvest), and a lot of rain is more detrimental to the crop than drought due to its deep 
roots. Also, attracting wild animals is not always a good thing – for one grower, two thirds of 
last year’s harvest was lost due to wild pigs rooting around in the field. 
There are, however, advantages of hemp compared to cereals; it is more resistant to fungi and 
other biological attacks and there is no weed control required, as the hemp outcompete other 
seeds (which makes the crop suitable for organic farms). In fact, the many production 
advantages of hemp are strong contributing factors to why some of the growers decided on 
this production activity. 
Hemp-growers are just like growers of other grass-like fuels (as opposed to woody crops like 
Salix) subject to a harvesting dilemma; they could either use a chopper for harvest to produce 
small fuel pieces at the field (chaff), which means that the transportation will be low-density 
and thus not very cost- or energy efficient, or harvest by mowing followed by baling, which 
means that more of the raw material can be fitted on the truck. On the other hand, the baling 
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is quite expensive and there must be a solution for crushing of the bales at the power plant. 
Research on harvest efficiency is on-going at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, 
as for example the option of a one-pass harvest that chops and bales in one step, thus 
avoiding losses of material that sinks back to the soil after the mowing step. Bales are made by 
pressing and are either round or square. 
6.5.2 Markets 
 
The market risk is currently the most significant risk associated with hemp growing. There are 
no guarantees and no contracts, buyers are few and sometimes hard to attract and previously, 
supplies of biofuel imported from the East was also worrying – although the rising cost of 
transportation seems to have had a dampening effect on this. Moreover – even though it 
strictly speaking should fall under the category of financial risk – Agria, the dominating 
agricultural insurance company in Sweden, has yet not agreed to insure the hemp.  
According to one grower, hemp cannot compete 
with wood chips or other energy sources if sold as 
raw material but must be sold as a value-added 
product as briquettes or pellets. This is supported 
by calculations by Rosenqvist (2006) showing that 
the production cost of hemp is 269 SEK/MWh, 
and with a price of 120-150 SEK/MWh at the gate in 
Skåne county (where the hemp-growers were 
located) this is clearly not feasible - thus the high 
interest in briquetting among hemp growers 
(pelleting is generally considered to costly and 
energy-intense). In the form of a briquette, a price of 490-590 SEK/MWh can be obtained 
(the higher price is explained by the fact that the end-users buy in small scale, for example a 
bag of 12 briquettes). However, if it would be economically viable, growers would also be 
open to the possibility of selling directly from the field, with no value added. 
In a broader perspective, hemp also has the potential of becoming construction material, if the 
fibers are separated from the straw, and also as input material for the pulp&paper industry 
instead of wood from forestry. Thus, the biofuel product could simply become a waste 
product from such production, similar to straw from cereal crops. One of the growers had in 
particular looked into this possibility, and regarding the current markets he could establish that 
if the separation of fibers and straw were to become economically viable, much larger volumes 
would have to be produced within a limited area than is the case today. Industries are currently 
not displaying much interest for the hemp either, but if he price of wood would rise as an 
input factor for the pulp&paper industry (which the majority of the growers are anticipating) 
hemp could potentially become competitive.  
A much larger market would also open up if the hemp was pelleted, and thereby could be 
transported longer distances. This option was however not particularly favored by anyone, 
because of the high cost and energy requirement of a pelleting machine. 
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6.5.3 Information needs 
 
The information need seems to be more on the buyers’ side than on the growers’ side – i.e. 
spreading the information of the benefits of hemp to various industries and more aggressive 
marketing would be more useful than additional information to growers, although some 
advice from experienced growers (not easy to find as the crop is relatively new) could be 
useful as well as more information about where to find buyers – but the core issue is currently 
to bridge the existing “gap” between producers and buyers. 
6.5.4 Barriers to the uptake of hemp 
 
Lack of buyers and lack of profitability is the generally stated reasons for why not more 
growers are interested in growing hemp, although some comments on farmers being 
traditional and afraid to try a new crop, or prefer to stick with cereals when the price is high – 
perhaps energy crops in general are also confused with Salix, which has gained a bad 
reputation of being detrimental to field drains (among other things).  
However, for a guaranteed extra revenue of 100 Euro/ha compared to cereals, it is generally 
believed that many growers would switch to energy crops – according to most interviewed 
farmers, the profitability overshadows other preferences (they also believe this to be true for 
other farmers) and although some might not like “shrubs on the fields”, farmers in general are 
increasingly looking to diversify and spread the risks.  
It was mentioned that large farms would not grow energy crops because they have invested in 
machines and equipment for conventional production, and are therefore slower to move to a 
new production activity. Also, the older farmers may be too traditional and the younger need 
some time to get comfortable with traditional farming before looking into something new and 
more risky. 
Regarding the issue of producing food or energy, the general view of the farmers interviewed 
for this study is that energy production is also important.   
6.6 Contract preferences 
 
This section is based on the result of the interviews with hemp-growers and presents the 
preferences stated by the growers with respect to contractual forms and price-setting. 
6.6.1 Duration of contracts 
 
The results of the study show that farmers are generally not interested in long-term contracts 
with buyers. They are aware that market conditions can change that turn a seemingly 
advantageous contract into a disadvantage, and new actors could appear that pay better than 
the current buyers. The situation is however somewhat different for value-added products like 
briquettes or separated hemp fibers for pulp&paper industry. Value-added products might 
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”No one is 
interested in 
long-term 
contracts 
today” 
appear less risky to sell with long-term contracts as the production 
cost not only depends on the conditions for raw material production, 
which the farmer has little influence on (for example volatile prices of 
fertilizers), but also on the farmers’ own work (i.e. briquetting) which 
is less sensitive to external conditions. This reduces the vulnerability 
of the production. Also, industries for value-added products, for 
example the pulp&paper industry, are expected to pay more - and in 
the end it all comes down to profits. 
- former 
grower of 
hemp in Skåne, 
Sweden 
Also, it was mentioned that the organization around growing must be 
more efficient to make long-term contracts feasible – and this emerging production sector 
does not seem to be ready for it yet.   
6.6.2 Price indexation 
 
Generally, this study shows that the preference is to index the price of the hemp to energy 
sources, because it is competing on the same market – although for input material, the hemp-
growers compete with cereal-growers. However, if the pulp&paper industry start to replace 
pulp fibers from forestry with hemp fibers (separated from the plant) the remaining hemp 
plant – in fact with better combustion properties than the fiber-containing plant – becomes a 
waste product – which would be in favor of the buyers, i.e. make this a cheap form of agro-
biofuel, and reduce the profitability requirements of the producers.    
6.6.3 Futures and options 
 
Some growers would consider buying and selling on the market of futures and options, 
however some are not interested at all in this option because it is considered risky to sell 
anything before the physical harvest is secured. For value-added products, this is not relevant 
as the market of futures and options are for trade of raw material. The interviewed growers 
had not previously considered this option.  
6.6.4 Contract growing 
 
Contract growing is a potential option for some of the growers. This option is suitable in the 
sense that special machines are required for the energy crop production, and individual farms 
cannot bear this investment cost. It seems however that the bigger the market and perceived 
profitability from the production activity, the more inclined is the farmer to grow 
independently. Presumably, the opposite is thus also true – a small market with low 
expectations on profitability makes contract growing more attractive (as it normally guarantees 
an income). For a new, not tried-and-tested product like hemp, contract farming could be an 
attractive option. 
6.6.5 Preferred point of sales 
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This study shows that entrepreneurial farmers want to sell as a value-added product (i.e. 
briquettes) because they believe in higher revenues than for the raw material, as raw material 
from the edge of the field or delivered to the buyer in order to control the costs as far in the 
production chain as possible and avoid middle hands. Some farmers are more flexible and 
prefer the most profitable option.  
According to information from the actors in the field (mainly the growers themselves), hemp-
growers in Sweden are mostly of the entrepreneurial kind (and often know each other even if 
not operating in the same regions) as it is a new crop that requires a value-adding process – 
exception is the farmers growing on contract for the experimental project of Lunds Energi 
and the Swedish University of Agriculture. 
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7.1 Growing miscanthus and switchgrass 
 
This section delineates the growers’ motivations for planting miscanthus and/or switchgrass, 
and the level of satisfaction with this decision among growers. 
7.1.1 Why plant? 
 
Six out of the twelve interviewed growers of miscanthus and switchgrass in France stated 
diversification as the main reason of choosing to grow energy crops. The wish to diversify, in 
its turn, is a consequence of the low cereal prices (before 2007), and moreover, the general 
desire to become more independent of the CAP by venturing into new and presumably more 
stable markets.  
Apart from diversification, differentiation was also given as 
a reason, as well as environmental commitment, hunting 
opportunities and retirement – several farmers considered 
energy crops to be an optimal crop for a farmer that was on 
the verge of retirement and wanted little work on his farm 
and also, a plantation to leave to his successor (often 
someone in the family, traditionally a son). Some planted 
because they had pieces of land not suitable for cereals, or 
because they wanted to do something with the set-aside 
land. One had planted in order to use on his own farm as he 
owned a boiler for straw.  
“In 2005, faced with 
slumping cereal prices, I 
was very pessimistic about 
the agricultural business. It 
was then a question about 
finding a solution for the 
future from which I could 
run a profitable business 
on the farm” - Franck 
Fournier, La Blanchedière, 
Dpt Indre-et-Loire 
7.1.2 Future of the plantations 
 
All growers visited in France had planted in 2006, 2007 or 2008, all planned to keep their 
plantations and almost all would consider expand it. For those who desired little work on the 
farm, the entire area could potentially be planted with energy crops. Important to note is that 
not all had harvested yet and no one could yet say whether or not the plantation had been a 
profitable investments or not. 
7.2 Risk perceptions 
 
This section is delineates the risk perceptions for growing of miscanthus and switchgrass. 
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7.2.1 Production  
 
Some had experienced problems with weed in the miscanthus-fields, in particular during rainy 
seasons when the weed grew stronger than the miscanthus. In a few cases, herbicides had not 
been properly applied to avoid this which implies in fact a lack of crop management 
skills/information. 
Generally, the energy crops were considered more resistant to biological attacks than cereals.  
Few of the farmers planting miscanthus today had yet harvested. Harvest is either performed 
with a maize chopper and transported as loose chaff of 2-3 cm, or chopped with a modified 
maize chopper and baled. 
7.2.2 Markets 
 
The farmers of Calvados in Normandy considered the market risk very small. All had already 
sold the current harvest, either to Bical (on the typical contract stretching over 7 years or 5 
harvests), a local conversion unit or as animal bedding. Also, they were sure there would be 
buyers and that the price would follow the price of wood chips.  The areas planted were in the 
French context large: between 5.3 and 25 ha, constituting between 5 and 13 % of the total 
farm area. 
For the farmers in Indre-et-Loire in 
Centre, the perception of the market risk 
was quite different: according to them the 
market was still underdeveloped with few 
buyers. A few had sold the crops as fuel 
for fodder dehydration, some had sold as 
chicken bedding and one was trying to 
sell to municipal boilers, yet with no 
result. However, they were growing 
between 1 and 4 ha, in all but one case 
constituting less than 1 % of the total 
farm area (the exception amounted to 8 
%) and thus the importance of the 
production in overall farm production was rather insignificant. Also, they had the support of 
the local Chambre d`Agriculture, were a project to stimulate growth of energy crops is 
currently running.  
In Eure et Loir, also in Centre, one of the growers had obtained a 15-year contract with the 
municipal boiler with a price indexed to conventional fuel (20 %), labor cost (60 %) and the 
wood chips price (20 %). Another one used his crop for heating at his own farm and thus not 
interested in the market, and yet another one had a 15-year contract with a cooperative for 
dehydration of luzerne and pellet production, also with a price linked to fuel, labor and the 
price for wood chips X. As opposed to the two first ones, he was more worried about the 
availability of buyers because he was in fact growing 200 ha – the total farm area -  in 
comparison to 2 ha each for the other two.  
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In all, the market risk is definitely the main risk associated with miscanthus/switchgrass 
cropping in France, because the market is still in development and those without the safety net 
of Bical to buy the crop are forced to venture into new areas to find potential buyers, acting 
more as “businessmen and marketers” than when selling conventional food crops.  
 
7.2.3 Information needs 
 
Lack of information is not considered a problem today since most farmers have access to 
Internet where there is plenty of information on the issue. Also, magazines and journals 
frequently publish articles about energy crop production. 
What would be requested by new growers, according to some of the interviewees was 
however information on where to find buyers and on potential profitability, i.e. market 
information. 
In Indre-et-Loire, Chambre d`Agriculture was held responsible to provide information on 
request, whereas the farmers in Eure et Loir and Calvados put this on Bical. However, for 
external advice in general the farmers also use the so called technical cooperatives, for example 
Agrial and Union Set. They were however not mentioned as responsible for providing 
information regarding energy crops – possibly because they have a clearly defined task in 
assisting and advising in conventional crop activities.  
 
7.2.4 Barriers to the uptake of energy crops 
 
The investment cost for the miscanthus field is very high at approximately 3 400 Euros per ha, 
which could therefore present a barrier to the uptake - in particular if it is difficult to obtain a 
credit which some growers had experienced. The cost of switchgrass is about a 10th of that, 
but on the other hand switchgrass has deeper roots which gave some farmers concern over 
the field drains.  
The special machines required for harvesting is another barrier, because most farmers do not 
possess the machines and must thus employ contractors. The cost of chopping is about 20 
Euro/ha and the cost of baling 40 Euros/h, and the cost of pelleting is about 60-70 Euro/ha 
(Leboeuf D., interview June 2008). The high cereal price is most definitely a barrier today, but 
also that the market for energy crops is new and underdeveloped, and there is a lack of buyers.  
Moreover, all of the French growers brought up the issue of food shortage in underdeveloped 
countries this year, some without being prompted. In fact, one farmer was not going to plant 
additional energy crops before the debate had blown over.  
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7.3 Contract preferences 
 
This section is based on the result of the interviews with growers of miscanthus and 
switchgrass and presents the preferences stated by the growers with respect to contractual 
forms and price-setting. 
7.3.1 Duration of contract 
 
Preferences for long- short- or midterm contracts appear to be quite individual. In Calvados, 
where the farmers felt reasonably secure regarding the availability of markets, a couple of 
farmers preferred a long-term contract such as the one already in place (7 years, 5 harvests) 
whereas two felt no need for a contract for more than one harvest. In general, there is no real 
pattern as to who want the long-term contract and who does not; some growers simply prefer 
the annual negotiations and to keep the options open whereas others prefer to have a few 
years ahead secured. 
 
7.3.2 Price indexation 
 
Linking the price of the energy crop to other sources of energy is by far more preferred than 
letting the price follow the profitability index for cereals. There were two reasons put forward 
for this; most growers seem to prefer as little manipulation of the market as possible, and 
most seem to believe that the price of energy will rise more than the price of cereals. Only one 
grower stated that he would prefer linking the price of the miscanthus to cereals.  
However, a combination of indexes was an option mentioned by a couple of farmers in Indre-
et-Loire and Eure et Loir – for example a combination index based on the cereal price, the 
energy price and labor costs, or based on consumer price index, price of cereals and price of 
energy with a certain portion fixed. 
7.3.3 Futures and options 
 
It was indicated in the study that using the market for futures and options for guaranteeing a 
certain price for their harvest is something that some farmers like and some do not, and in 
general there is a concern about making trades in advance regarding a crop that is not yet 
harvested because in case of unexpectedly low yield the deficiency must be bought from 
elsewhere. 
7.3.4 Contract growing 
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The option of contract growing where a buyer dictates the production process was rejected by 
all farmers.  
7.3.5 Preferred point of sales 
 
In Indre-et-Loire, delivering the harvest to the buyer and thus selling at the gate was by far the 
most interesting option to the interviewed farmers. They considered this the option that 
would allow for keeping the most added-value. An exception was a retired farmer who wanted 
as little work as possible.  
 
In Eure et Loir one grower preferred selling from the edge of the field because it gave him the 
possibility to influence the quality of the harvest. Other growers in the department were 
simply looking at profitability and would calculate the most beneficial option. In Calvados, the 
growers had no preference but most were currently selling from the edge of the field. An 
exception was a retired farmer who wanted to sell on the root to avoid extra work. That 
means that all the retirees prefer selling on the root. 
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8 Results: Finland 
 
 
8.1 Growing Reed Canary Grass (RCG) 
 
This section delineates the growers’ motivations for planting RCG, and the level of 
satisfaction with this decision among growers. 
8.1.1 Why plant? 
 
Growers often plant on cut-over 
peat lands that are not suitable for 
cereal production, or simply on the 
worst soils or fallow land. The 
plantation is cheap and the work 
input is minimal; 10 ha take a 
couple of days to harvest at the 
most (performed by contractors) 
and fertilization is not always 
necessary. Also, RCG evens out the 
work load because it is harvested in 
spring at a time when there is little 
other work on a typical farm.  
According to Proagria, an 
agricultural consultant company advising thousands of farmers, there are three types of RCG-
growers; former cattle farms that are changing to a new business activity, elderly people that 
no longer want conventional farming activity and farmers that work outside of the farm. 
Diversification is not a motivation for planting a dedicated energy crops, according to 
Proagria, because it is not profitable enough to rely on as income. Most of the interviewed 
farmers did in fact have jobs outside the farm, and the estimated importance of the revenues 
from RCG was small, from insignificant to a few percent of total incomes (although up to 25 
% of income from farming activities).  
8.2 Risk perceptions 
 
This section is delineates the risk perceptions for growing of miscanthus and switchgrass. 
8.2.1 Production 
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For RCG the harvesting period is relatively short, because the heavy harvest machines requires 
a frozen ground and the short window of time for harvesting increases the sensitivity to the 
weather conditions. Storage is another problem, in particular if the bales are not fetched by 
Vapo or the power plant when expected – covering the bales with plastic is not economical 
but when stored on the field the moisture content and thereby the quality of the fuel 
decreases.  
Further technical issues concerns the form in which the RCG is delivered, which in its turn 
depends on the machinery and equipment available at the farm and at the power plant. Bales 
are produced with densities of approximately 136 and 148 kg ds/m^3 for round and square 
bales respectively (VTT, 2008), and thus be transported with a higher density than loose chaff, 
chopped at the farm (for example by harvesting and chopping simultaneously). A truck load 
of 38 500 kg is according to calculations from VTT carrying 34 MWh of loose chaff, 50-57 
MWh of round bales and up to 79 MWh of square bales. In other words, more than twice as 
many truck loads are required to deliver the same amount of primary energy if the RCG is 
delivered as loose chaff instead of bales, with increased cost, fuel use and emissions as a result. 
The bales must however be crushed at the power plant, which is a potential issue since most 
power plants have crushers adapted to the heavier wood fuel. If the grass is not properly 
crushed in the crushing step, it can block the conveyors and the feeding into silos and 
combustion chambers. A solution preferred by some power plants is to have RCG delivered 
as a mixture with peat or logging residues. In practice this means that the harvested RCG is 
transported to a peat production site or logging site for crushing and mixing.  
Apart from the technical issues, no diseases are yet discovered on RCG and the biological risk 
is lower than for cereals (the growers indicate that it is in principle non-existent). Moreover, 
RCG can be planted on former peat lands or soils with lower quality – in particular due to the 
low requirements on yields (explained in section 7.3.2). 
8.2.2 Markets 
 
Harvesting, i.e. mowing and baling, is expensive – according to growers more or less the same 
as the price of the product itself; estimations range from about 90 - 170 Euro/ha for mowing 
and baling (5-8 Euro/MWh based on yields from 3.25 – 5.5 dry ton/ha) with baling 
constituting at least 70 % of the cost.  
A breakdown of the production cost as calculated by VTT is found in Appendix C.  
As noted by several growers and confirmed by calculations from VTT, the high cost of baling 
makes the curve of revenue vs. crop yield distorted, with a higher yield not meaning higher 
profits. It can therefore be strategic to have an average yield, perhaps not even to fertilize the 
crop (although a minimum yield of 3 dry ton/ha is required to receive the energy crop aid). 
Another aspect of this is that approximately 2/3 of the income from RCG production is from 
subsidies, lowering the importance of high productivity (Proagria).  
The high dependence on subsidies also implies that the market is artificial, and the confidence 
in the product could potentially be lower (as will be seen in the next chapter).    
However, none of the interviewed farmers considered the market risk to be a threat, although 
few had more than one option – either to sell to Vapo or directly to a power plant, depending 
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on geographical location. Local greenhouses or boilers could be an option, but demand is 
limited. The sense of security the farmers seem to experience in Finland is explained by the 5-
year contract with Vapo and PVO plants. The contracts are also relatively easily cancelled, and 
the price is regularly renegotiated – thus, being “trapped” in a highly unfavorable contract if 
conditions change is not a risk.  
Regarding profitability, many consider the price as too low, barely covering production costs, 
whereas others in fact stated to get a reasonable profit from the production or even that RCG 
can be the second most profitable land use options – the first being having uncultivated land. 
According to Teuvo Paappanen (interview, August 18), it is in fact a “moral issue” of the 
Finnish farmers to produce cereals at all, due to high entitlements for fallow land – a further 
discussion on this is however out of the scope of this study. 
Prices paid for RCG are indexed to quality (moisture content), the price of CO , transport 
distance and sometimes yield. Appendix E and F contains contract agreements by Vapo and 
PVO. The fluctuating price of CO can be the difference between low and high profitability 
for the farmer – several estimate that a price of CO 2 at about 20 Euro/ton makes the RCG 
production profitable (i.e. reach a level of accepted profitability). The fluctuations in price of 
CO 2  also explain the varying perceptions of profitability of RCG. However, technical 
problems at the plants have sometimes caused delays in fetching the bales at the field, and 
since covering bales with plastic is generally considered too expensive to be viable, there is a 
risk that the moisture content increases during storage, lowering the price paid.  
2
2
Farmers stated that the profitability of RCG must be at least as high as for cereals to be of 
interest.  
8.2.3 Barriers to the uptake of energy crops 
 
Besides a low price received in relation to the production costs (in particular baling costs) 
there are according to interviewees still elderly farmers with strong traditions that are not in 
favor of cropland being used for other end-uses than food production.  
Another barrier is that the power plants in principle have all the negotiation power and 
thereby can dictate the price paid to the farmer (Proagria). 
Regarding the issue of producing energy on arable land, the general perceptions is that the 
current overproduction of food in Finland, with the country being a net exporter of cereals, 
allows for energy crops being cultivated on land that represents this overproduction, or on 
fallow lands/former peat lands (not suitable for cereal production). 
The esthetical barrier seems non-existent – RCG is generally under the height of 2 meters and 
does not have the look of a “dense” crop as hemp or miscanthus (not to mention Salix). Also, 
from the landscaping perspective it is favored by farmers over having fallow land. 
 
8.3 Contractual preferences 
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This section is based on the result of the interviews with RCG-growers and presents the 
preferences stated by the growers with respect to contractual forms and price-setting.  
8.3.1 Duration of contract 
 
Farmers in Finland are very satisfied with the 5-year contracts, allowing for price 
renegotiations 1-2 times a year. There are two aspects of the five-year period that makes it 
particularly suited for the activity; the perennial nature of reed canary grass favors a long-term 
contract over a short-term and the period of five years is a reasonable time for commitment 
and planning ahead. 
8.3.2 Price indexation 
 
Generally, the farmers indicate that they wish to be paid to get paid as much for the RCG as 
the suppliers of wood chips get paid for their product. Linking the price of RCG to the cereal 
price is however perceived as a means of reducing the risk of low economic returns, because 
the policies related to bioenergy production are perceived as volatile. As approximately two 
thirds of the income from reed canary grass comes from subsidies (according to Proagria) the 
concern about the durability of the subsidies is justified. It was mentioned that a link to cereal 
price would make comparisons with cereal production easier for the farmer who has to make 
the choice, although this alternative was not really preferred by anyone.  
8.3.3 Futures and options 
 
The market for futures and options seems to be a more or less unfamiliar concept among 
Finnish farmers.   
 
8.3.4 Preferred point of sales 
 
In principle the current model where the buyer fetches the bales at the edge of the field has 
the most advantages for the farmers. Many plant RCG in order to have less work on the farm 
and do not want to deal with the transportation issue, and have no machinery for crushing of 
the bales – required to feed it to the boiler and currently done either by the power plant on-
site or by Vapo while mixed with peat at a peat production site. However, farmers that possess 
the machinery would consider – if it proves to be profitable – carrying out as many steps of 
the chain as possible before the sale. Selling on the root is also a possibility but this option 
reduces the possibility of selling a part of the harvest to someone else than Vapo or RCG, as 
for example local greenhouses (that are expected to pay more).  
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9 Results: Fuel-users’ perspective 
 
9.1 Sweden 
 
The results of the interviews with representatives of heating plants and energy companies in 
Sweden are presented here. 
9.1.1 Future of biofuel and agro-biofuel 
 
According to Rolf Slagbrandt at Agroenergi AB, the attitudes towards biofuel at the heating 
plants are changing as the plants are increasingly concerned about securing supply of 
bioenergy, including agro-bioenergy. They are ready to pay more for the product and to buy 
larger volumes (an example is Eskilstuna district heating plant. In the past the interest from 
Eskilstuna has been quite luke-warm, but it is now the largest buyer of Salix from Agroenergi).  
This is consistent with the results from interviews of six energy companies producing district 
heating in Skåne and Södermanland. All had projected the biofuel prices to rise as the supply 
no longer can meet demand – both due to potential political decisions such as an increased 
share of ethanol in the total vehicle fuel mix in Sweden (with the requirement of this ethanol 
being produced in Sweden), due to international demand and to the fact that an increasing 
amount of heat- and power plants adapted to biofuels rather than oil and gas are built, driven 
by the high oil- and gas prices. This means that primary energy must be found elsewhere, and 
in particular in Södermanland which is a region with an undersupply of biofuel, the demand is 
increasingly met through agro-biofuel and waste products.  
In Skåne, the attitude towards agro-bioenergy is still quite luke-warm, biofuel is about 25 % 
cheaper and yet no shortage of supply seems to be worrying the energy producing companies. 
Lunds Energi, owned by four municipalities in the county of Skåne, estimated that their entire 
need for biomass could be met by Skåne’s forests only, and moreover E.ON is in fact within 
the near future closing down its biofuelled plant in Malmö, which means that the major buyer 
of Salix in the region disappears. Instead, a new plant fuelled with natural gas is currently 
under construction in Malmö’s East Harbor.   
9.1.2 Conditions supporting/preventing agro-biofuel use 
 
Whether or not the heating plant will purchase agro-biofuel is to a large extent dependent on 
the type of boilers they use. For example, Sjöbo heating plant (owned by Rindi AB) has boilers 
adapted to biofuel with high moisture content, with flue gas condensers to extract highest 
possible amount of energy from biomass with about 40 % moisture content. Thus, this is well 
suited for combustion of Salix but they are not interested in combusting straw, hemp, 
miscanthus and RCG. Kristianstads’ heating plant experienced technical problems of sintering 
when in the middle of the 1990’s, they started feeding Salix to their boilers – ash from Salix 
has a lower ash melting point than wood chips from forestry. The situation today with a 
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higher price for Salix than for wood chips in the region (f they pay 120-125 SEK/MWh for 
wood chips today, but are expecting to pay 150-160 SEK/MWh in 2-3 years) has not given 
them any incentive to start using Salix as fuel again.  
 
Lunds Energi is currently burning 90 % natural gas and bio oil and only 10 % biomass, of 
which nothing so far is agro-biofuel (most is wood chips, recycled wood and wood briquettes) 
– however, two new boilers are planned, one for wood chips with ~10% mix of straw or 
hemp, and one mainly for straw but dedicated energy crops are also possible. The boilers are 
expected to stand ready in 2010 and 2014 respectively (the project has been delayed due to a 
high price of steel, required for building materials and equipment). They are currently involved 
in a hemp-production project with the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences where they 
have contracted three farmers to grow hemp in order to evaluate the technical and commercial 
viability of the crop – according to Peter Ottosson the result so far is hardly optimistic, in 
particular not on the economic side. The company is not prepared to pay more than about 150 
SEK/MWh for Salix chips (slightly above the 140 SEK/MWh the company is paying for 
wood chips), which according to calculations from the company equals 0.6-0.65 SEK/kg. This 
can be compared to a reasonable price for the farmer taking into account the production cost, 
as estimated by Lars Bengtsson (previously growing hemp at Valterslund, Skåne) at 1 SEK/kg 
for the raw material (i.e. not refined to briquettes or pellets) delivered in bales.   
E.ON in Malmö has been using 10 
% Salix in the fuel mix (which is the 
maximum blend for avoiding 
sintering in the boilers) but states 
that this is only because they can buy 
the Salix chips about 10 % cheaper 
than the forest residues - and 
because they want to have a large 
fuel portfolio as a long-term strategy 
for staying in a favorable position 
when the supply and demand 
change.    
Biofuel has become the cheaper 
alternative to combust compared to 
oil and natural gas, illustrated by the 
fact that at Lunds Energi with only 10 % biofuel, the fuel cost is 70 % (according to the 
company’s calculations, this would have been 50 % if the natural gas was replaced with biofuel 
– thus justifying the investment in new boilers)  of the company’s total expenses whereas at 
Rindi AB in Skåne (four heating plants) with 97 % biofuel of which 5 % is Salix, the share of 
fuel of total expenses is 40 % and ENA Energi 60 % - which could be explained by the fact 
that they are operating in Södermanland where the biofuel prices are higher.  
9.1.3 Contracts and price-setting 
 
The energy companies are in general interested in long-term contracts, in particular the two 
companies interviewed in Södermanland County where the need for securing additional 
bioenergy sources seemed more acute than in Skåne (although at Mälarenergi it is stated that a 
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the perspective in which a supply must be secured is not longer than three years – markets, 
actors and options change over time).  
Although the general impression is that it is a buyers’ market both in Södermanland and Skåne 
and the growers basically have to accept the price they are given for their product, it is the 
growers that are reluctant to committing to a long-term contract whereas the energy 
companies are interested in 5-10 year contracts, preferably with recurring price negotiations 
each year. Most companies interviewed have long-term contracts with suppliers, except for 
Lunds Energi and E.ON Malmö who negotiate on a yearly basis and with a review of the 
agreement twice each fuel season (August 1 – July 30). With forest residue suppliers they have 
agreed to share the risk of increase in the diesel price – the theory behind is that otherwise the 
forestry suppliers will add a risk premium to the price, risk referring to the price risk for diesel.  
Lunds Energi is expecting to have a mix of long-term and short-term contract for agro-biofuel 
producers with a share of 10-15 % open to buy on the spot-market and to adjust for variability 
of heat demand in the society in which they operate. Another option is to use a Danish model 
where the growers leave their offers at the heating plant which simply purchases in the order 
of lowest price offer first and so on. Rindi AB has a similar approach to contractual 
arrangements, wanting to secure about 70 % in contracts for several years in advance and 
leave 30 % open to local growers to fill. 
In a way consistent with the farmers’ reluctance to such price indexation (since they are on the 
opposite sides of the negotiation table), Lunds Energi would prefer to link the price to CPI. 
Rindi AB is linking the price of wood chips to “machine index”, based on fuel and wages for 
machine operators (i.e. harvesters) and to CPI. Adjustment of prices to the price of oil is also a 
feasible option for E.ON Malmö. Rindi AB considers CPI to be a viable option to use as price 
index – or simply the costs experienced by the grower. They would not like to compete with 
the food market by linking price to cereals – rather, the price of energy crops could be indexed 
to price of straw and other organic waste products.  In Kristianstad, the price of wood chips 
has been indexed to the diesel price, as suggested by Swedish Transport Workers Union, 
which has proven successful.  
At ENA Energi in Enköping, the approach is that the price should reflect the production cost 
for the grower, including machine costs (machine index) and Mälarenergi in Västerås would 
consider an index to CPI or to a transport index.  
 
9.1.4 Drivers of price change for fuel, heat and electricity 
 
Prices of fuel are not following any other prices or indexed, but governed by supply and 
demand. Demand has two components; demand for heat (governed by the weather) and 
demand for fuel (both from other heating plants, international demand and unexpected events 
like storms that can increase the stored amount of damaged wood tremendously).  
It is also clear that the price of biofuel depends on regional supply and demand, since the 
maximal transportation distance viable – even for forestry residues – is 100 km. The large 
price difference between central and Southern Sweden is natural due to low supply of biofuel 
in central Sweden in combination with a large population and consequential high demand for 
district heating. Skåne has experienced oversupply of biofuel as of lately. 
Investigating potential contract models to stimulate commercial production of energy crops 
9.2 Finland 
 
9.2.1 Perspective on agro-biofuel 
 
In the Fortum power plant in Joensuu (Fortum Voima Joensuu) about 1/6 of the RCG 
produced in the country is consumed (VTT). Still, this constitutes only about 0.5 % of the 
total fuel use in the plant, and about the same share of RCG is used in Vaskiluodon Voima (a 
PVO plant) in Seinäjoki and the Fortum power plant in Jyväskylä. The marginal share is to a 
certain extent due to technical restraints in the boiler which can be negatively affected by the 
chlorine content, but even more due to logistical issues; the crushing of the bales can take 
place either at peat production sites and arrive to the power plant as a mixture of peat and 
RCG, or be crushed on site and on the conveyors mixed with peat or wood chips. Mixture at 
peat production sites by the supplier requires transportation of the RCG to these sites, and the 
nature of the light RCG straws can cause problems with on-site crushing in the chain from 
crusher to silos to boiler; at PVO’s plant in Seinäjoki, there is at least one event per week 
where RCG chaff interferes with the feeding to the boilers. 
The volume produced within a reasonable area of the power plant (about 60 km) is also a 
determining factor, but is not always the limiting factor. Within a reasonable area of the 
Joensuu power plant 50 GWh of RCG is produced, which if used at the plant would be 5-10 
% of total fuel use, but the plant is still not interested in purchasing such a volume unless it is 
properly mixed with peat to a maximum of 10 % on the conveyors (by the suppliers). Power 
plants in Finland are in general adapted to peat and wood chips, and although it would be a 
small investment for the plants to build an additional conveyor line for RCG, they are not 
eager to make such investments - partly because RCG is used in such small volumes and partly 
due to the fact that the profitability of producing RCG is heavily dependent on subsidies 
which makes an investment risky because policies can change. Rather, the plants state that 
they are using RCG because they want to be part of something new, and seem to be 
supporting new research and development more than they are securing their own need for 
fuel. 
 
In general however, the desire is to increase the amount of biofuel used in the plant (forestry 
products like logging residues), much due to the policy situation including a tax refund on 
electricity for wood fuel (as of today, not comprising RCG) and the European Trading 
Scheme (ETS) for carbon emission rights, that puts a price on CO and thus favors renewable 
energy sources. Peat is not classified as renewable, but is on the other hand cheaper to 
purchase for the plant than biofuel. Also, there is an awareness that the competition on these 
biofuels are increasing, for several reasons; new power plants, competition from the 
pulp&paper industry and the unpredictability of Russian import/export policies for wood. 
The availability of by-products like sawdust and bark is also decreasing because it is pelleted 
and sold on different markets.  
2
9.2.2 Price-setting 
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The contracts that PVO plants have with producers (Appendix F) are based on moisture 
content, transportation distance and price of CO 2 . In Vapos’ contracts, the price is calculated 
based on amount of harvest, moisture content, transportation distance and the price paid by 
the power plant. According to one of the power plants, the price of RCG is in between the 
relatively cheap peat (8-9 Euro/MWh) and the wood fuel (13 Euro/MWh), and could be the 
same as for wood fuel if the technical issues were resolved, and another power plant assumes 
the price of peat for RCG and adjusts this to the price of CO  (which means that the 
producer can get a higher price if the price of CO 2  high). Proagria, the agronomic advisor, is 
however certain that power plants could bay 15-16 Euro/MWh and still make profits – it is all 
a matter of negotiation power and the lack of organization among the farmers. 
2
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9.2.3 Drivers of price change for fuel, heat and electricity  
 
The price of electricity and heat are determined by the price of CO 2 , the fuel price and the tax 
refund for electricity granted by the government. Fuel prices are mainly determined by 
demand from other industries in the region.  
Policies regarding the use of biofuel are recognized as a factor that would increase the share of 
biofuel in the Finnish energy mix in the future and thus also increase the competition for 
supplies. The general “fear” is that biofuel prices will increase, perhaps to 15-16 Euro/MWh 
within a year. Such a price increase would drive the power plants to look for additional 
sources of primary energy and could make energy crops an economical option, to the extent 
that they are technically feasible to use (that is, maximum 10-15 % of fuels in the combustion 
chamber). Perhaps new investments would also be considered to reduce the logistical 
problems associated with energy crop use at the power plants.  
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10 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, the three commercial energy crop production systems studied and the role of 
farmers as energy producers will be discussed. Then the conclusions of this study, based on 
these results presented in the previous chapters, are presented and the research questions from 
section 1.2 will be answered to the extent possible.  
10.1  Comparing energy crop production systems 
 
Sweden, France and Finland are in different stages of developing a market for energy crops. 
Salix and RCG has a relatively long history in Sweden and Finland respectively, which means 
that initial problems have or should have been overcome. In the case of RCG, possible initial 
problems seem to have been overcome since both production risks and market risks are 
perceived as insignificant, whereas the Salix-production is still having problems and more and 
more stakeholders are having doubts regarding the future of the crop.  
The success of RCG in Finland is however partly an illusion, because it is heavily based on 
subsidies and the “goodwill” of the power plants. The quantities of RCG supplied to the 
plants is often negligible compared to the total fuel quantities required for the energy 
production, and in some cases the RCG is in fact causing the plants technical problems every 
week. However, it seems like the power plants continue buying the crop in order to support 
the production and perhaps also as a way of improving the company image.  
Another reason that the system seem to be so “harmonic” compared to the Swedish system is 
that many growers are not relying on the income from the RCG for the survival of their 
businesses (or for feeding the family for that matter), but cultivate it on the side of other 
activities (farm activities or external jobs). This obviously dampens the need for reducing risks 
and increasing profitability.  
In the future, it could go either way; perhaps the RCG becomes increasingly profitable as a 
business activity due to increased prices of other primary energy sources such as woody 
biomass, oil or peat, or perhaps the plants tire of the technical issues and finds other means of 
appearing “green”, i.e. with renewable energy sources in the fuel mix.  
The 5-year contract provided by Vapo and the PVO group in Finland seem to work very well 
for growers and fuel-users. A similar security is found in parts of France where Bical is 
providing contracts with similar degree of duration, stretching over 5 harvests (7 years as there 
is no harvest the first two years). The growers in these areas are certain of a future market of 
energy crops, especially with rising oil- and gas prices and expected increase in demand for 
biofuel. The perceived market risk is thus lowered with such a contract.  
The situation described above would imply that the Swedish production of Salix or hemp 
could take a leap forward if there were buyers providing similar type of long-term contracts, 
for example Agroenergi or energy companies/heating plants. But what might seem odd is that 
few of the interviewed growers are at all interested in long-term contract as a theoretical 
option – rather it is the power plants that are looking for such commitment from the farmers.  
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Generally, there is still a gap between the markets and the producers, or perhaps a time lag – 
producers are expecting to be commercially viable in a time when biofuel is clearly favored 
over conventional fuels like oil- and gas by policymakers and an increase in competition is to 
be expected, but the buyers are not yet admitting to being in want for additional primary 
energy sources or willing to pay more than they currently do – or perhaps this impression is 
part of a business strategy. However, in the Central part of Sweden where biofuel prices are up 
to 33% higher than in the Southern part, it is definitely starting to show that there is a demand 
for agro-biofuel for district heating boilers, and if the international competition for biofuel 
increases due to political decisions or rising oil price, it is likely that the energy companies in 
Southern Sweden follow suit.  
10.2  Should farmers be producing energy and do they want to? 
 
Most studies so far on the topic of attitudes towards energy crops show that farmers have an 
aversion to such crops because they might change the landscape to the worse, they are new 
and risky both from the production- and market perspective and moreover, it is 
counterintuitive for the farmer to plant shrubs on cropland. However, although the main 
conclusion of this work can be summarized in the introductory quote “If there are buyers, there 
will be growers”, which has been a recurring remark from interviewees during this work, other 
perspectives on the matter have been that a farmer can be tired of cereals and want to try 
something new, want to diversify or become less dependent on subsidies and therefore want 
to expose themselves to the promising energy market, on which prices have been rising 
continuously in the first half of 2008.  
In fact, some growers interviewed for this study were not as impressed by the price increase 
for cereals as by the oil price boom that made biofuels determinedly favorable over fossil fuels 
for heat- and power plants. Moreover, aging farmers in all three countries studied discover the 
benefits of planting something with less work requirement on the farm, just like farm-owners 
who have jobs outside of the farm or want farming more as a hobby because they happen to 
be landowners. 
Regarding the different views on whether energy production should replace food production 
on arable land, there might be historical and geographical reasons as to why the French 
farmers consistently expressed concern about agro-biofuel production pushing out food 
production, whereas the Swedish farmers concluded that energy production is equally 
important and the Finnish farmers did not seem to reflect over this issue at all.  This could be 
due to the fact that Sweden and Finland are Northern countries with cold climates, where 
availability of stored energy for heating purposes has been as crucial for survival as food. Also, 
the position of France in the middle of Europe compared to the somewhat more periphery 
location of Sweden and Finland, and the huge importance of France as producer of 
agricultural products (i.e., food) could be a reason for the much greater concern of the French 
farmers than the Swedish and Finnish over energy production substituting food production.  
 
10.3 Conclusions  
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10.3.1   Risk perceptions for commercial production of energy crops 
 
The study indicates that energy crops should be planted by entrepreneurial farmers who can 
integrate far into the production chain (possess machines and possibly negotiation skills) and 
thus reduce the amount of middle hands and have high cost control. Inactive farmers who will 
accept a low economic return from the land in return for a small labor input can sell the crop 
on the root. Active farmers are generally the least satisfied with the energy crop production - a 
better organization in place among the farmers themselves in order to strengthen negotiation 
power and increase the cost control could perhaps alter the perception that the economic 
results of the production of energy crops is unacceptably low.  
For the grass crops like hemp, miscanthus, switchgrass and RCG, the production risk is in fact 
perceived as lower than for cereals. Harvesting techniques, other logistical issues and 
combustion technologies for dry crops with relatively high ash content and low ash melting 
points (compared to wood chips) however need to be improved in order to reduce costs and 
increase competitiveness. These production issues have significant implications for the 
economic results from the production activity, in particular for attracting buyers.  
A medium high degree of duration of a contract reduces the market risk perception. This is 
illustrated by the fact that the market risk was found to constitute a tangible risk in all cases 
due to the insufficiently evolved markets, except for the Finnish case, where the 5-year 
contracts appear to suit both parties, and in a few cases in France where 7-year contracts were 
perceived as having ideal length by producers.  
Both the market situation and the policy situation are almost exclusively expected to work in 
favor of the energy crop producers (i.e., higher price) in the future. Policies are however 
perceived as volatile both for agricultural production and for bioenergy, and a business activity 
strongly dependent on policies is not perceived as reliable. A more reliable policy environment 
could therefore increase the uptake of energy crops as well as the use of energy crops by heat- 
and power producers. 
The information need is hardly overwhelming, since most farmers today have 
internet-connection and access to advisors and agricultural journals and magazines. However, 
experience exchange and study visits among farmers were requested, in particular in Sweden. 
More contact with markets and potential buyers is also requested, and a potential means of 
strengthening the energy crop producers’ market position would be to provide consultations 
with marketing experts – marketing is hardly what the typical farmer is used to, but perhaps 
what the farmer who wants to succeed on the energy market (in the case of agro-biofuel, the 
local or regional energy market) needs.   
10.3.2   Proposed contract model for commercial production of energy crops  
 
Based on the results from interviews with growers and users of energy crops, it appears that a 
preferable duration is some 5 years, i.e. medium high degree of duration. However, if it is to 
achieve some outcome, the degree of duration should be compensated by a high degree of 
flexibility to attract the farmers, who particularly in Sweden are reluctant to long-term 
contractual commitments, meaning that price negotiations should take place every year and 
both parties (in particular, this is important for the growers because the energy crop 
Marie Kimming, IIIEE, Lund University 
production is typically more important in their business portfolio than the agro-biofuel is to 
the power plant) can cancel the contract if circumstances fundamentally change.  
The degree of cost control is preferably worked out on an individual basis with the farmer 
(unless this conveys unacceptable costs), and could very well vary depending on the farmer 
category he/she belongs; farmers who are agricultural entrepreneur tend to favor selling at the 
gate, active farmers tend to favor selling at the edge of the field and inactive farmers tend to 
favor selling on the root. A solution could be to develop three different contractual models 
according to the desired degree of cost control. 
Figure 10-1 shows the conceptual contract model, where the red line indicates the proposed 
contract model for commercial production of energy crops.  
 
Degree of Duration 
Degree of 
Cost 
Control 
Degree of Flexibility  
 
Figure 10-1 Conceptual contract model applied to European commercial production of energy crops 
 
The price for the agro-biofuel is preferably following the price conventional biofuel. This is 
often a natural development since they are comparable products. As little manipulation of the 
markets as possible is an advantage in order to build up confidence for the agro-biofuel as a 
reliable primary energy source, and justify investments to adapt to this type of fuel. 
However, having a part of the price indexed to the oil- and diesel price index or price 
renegotiations regularly or in case of drastic price increases will divide the risk of suddenly 
increasing transportation costs between the producers and fuel-users and seem to be a feasible 
and fair option, based on what has been stated in interviews.    
As a quality assurance measure for the fuel-user, it is reasonable that the price varies with the 
moisture content (i.e., quality) of the delivered product and that the “windfall revenues” from 
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financial policy instruments applied over Europe or nationally, for example the European 
Trading Scheme, tax refunds on electricity or feed-in tariffs, be paid to the farmer as an 
incentive or “carrot”.  
 
10.4 Future research needs 
 
This has been a mostly qualitative study, delineating the risk perceptions, barriers and 
contractual preferences among producers and users of agro-biofuel. A statistical study to 
follow up on the findings and conclusions would provide a better understanding of the 
(relative) magnitudes of the risk perceptions. In particular, a survey over contractual 
preferences to show whether the preferences delineated in this study for the contractual model 
proposed can be statistically verified.  
Several findings in this study could be investigated on a more detailed level. This includes the 
potential economic results of energy crop production for the three categories of farmers given 
different circumstances or “scenarios”, and a thorough analysis underpinning the 
categorization, and detailing the conditions under which each category is operating. For 
example, the level of debt (high for entrepreneurial farmers who bought their land to market 
price and low for inactive farmers who perhaps have inherited their land?), implying different  
perception of the alternative cost of land, and how this affects the choice of production 
activity.   
Another area of research to explore is how the state or municipality could be involved in a 
contract model for a case like this when subsidies might be an absolute requirement for the 
business activity to be viable. Should this in fact be a three-part contract, involving the 
producer, the buyer and the State? 
Marie Kimming, IIIEE, Lund University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Investigating potential contract models to stimulate commercial production of energy crops 
61 
Bibliography 
 
Articles and Reports 
Rosenqvist, H., Peck, P. (2008). Risk and Reduction of Risk in Short Rotation Coppice Cropping. IIIEE, Lund University 
Helby, P., et al. (2006). Retreat from Salix – Swedish experience with energy crops in the 1990s. Biomass and 
Bioenergy, 30(5), 422-427 
Helby, P., et al (2004). Market development problems for sustainable bio-energy use in Sweden. Environmental and Energy 
Systems Studies, Lund University 
Andersson, B. (1978). Investeringsplanering i lantbruket. Teoretiska grunder och förslag till metod. Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala.  
Drescher, K., (2000). Assessing Aspects of Agricultural Contracts: An Application to German Agriculture. 
Agribusiness, 16(4), 385-398 
Fleisher, B. (1990). Agricultural Risk Management. London. 
Paulrud, S., Laitila, T. (2007). Lantbrukarnas attityder till odling av energigrödor, värderingsstudie med choice experiment. 
Göteborg: IVL, Svenska Miljöinstitutet. 
Roos, A., et al. (2000). Farm-related Factors Influencing the Adoption of Short-rotation Willow Coppice 
Production Among Swedish Farmers. Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section B – Plant Soil Science, 50:1, 28-34 
Rosenqvist, H., et al. (1999). Willow growers in Sweden. Biomass and Bioenergy 18, 137-145 
Rosenqvist, H. (1997). Salixodling – Kalkylmetoder och lönsamhet [Salix Growing – Calculation Methods and 
Profitability . Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Uppsala. 
Sharpe, W.F. (1964). Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions of Risk. Journal of 
Finance 19, 425-442  
Robinson, L. J., Barry, P.J. (1987). The Competitive firm’s response to risk. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company 
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Science 185, 1124-1131 
Johansson, S., Olofsson, R. (2008). Hampans möjligheter som energigröda [Potential of hemp as energy crop]. 
Agroväst Livsmedel AB and Swedish Board of Agriculture, Grästorp 
Mattson, J-E (2008). Affärsutveckling – Närodlade stråbränslen till kraftvärmeverk [Business development – Local straw 
fuels for CHP plants]. Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Alnarp 
Junginger et.al. The Pellets@las project – a comprehensive European pellet market overview. Copernicus Institute, the 
Netherlands 
Bioenergi från Jordbruket – en växande resurs (2007). Jönköping: Jordbruksdepartementet, Statens offentliga utredningar, 
2007. SOU 2007:36 
 
Electronic sources 
Chambre d’Agriculture. (2008). [Online]. Available: http://paris.apca.chambagri.fr/apca/default.htm  [2008, 
August 19] 
Bical. (2008). [Online]. Available: http://www.bical.fr/ [2008, August 19] 
European Commission. (2008). [Online] Available: http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/bioenergy/index_en.htm    
[2008, August 19] 
World Food Organization (2008) [Online] Available: http://www.fao.org/bioenergy/home/en/ [2008, June 20] 
Investor Words (2008) [Online] Available: http://www.investorwords.com/5977/vertical_integration.html 
[2008, September 12] 
Marie Kimming, IIIEE, Lund University 
 
Fingrain (2008) [Online] Available: http://fingrain.multiedition.fi/multimagazine/web/viljaopas/sv/4.php, 
[2008, September 12] 
Cardiff School of Biosciences [Online] Available: http://www.walesbiomass.org/grass-switchgrass.htm, [2008, 
September 12] 
 
Interviews 
 
Name Role / Company Time and place of interview Comment 
Larsson, S. Agroenergi May 25, Småland, Sweden Not following question sheet 
Mattson, G. Salix-grower June 3, Skåne, Sweden Pilot interview 
Segerslätt, S. Salix-grower June 3, Skåne, Sweden  
Eriksson, H. Farmarenergi 
Hallstahammar 
June 5, Södermanland, Sweden Telephone interview 
Nyrén, J. Mälarenergi June 5, Södermanland, Sweden Telephone interview 
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Persson, S. Rindi AB June 18, Skåne, Sweden Pilot interview 
Jour, B. Miscanthus-grower June 23, Eure et Loir, France  
Maria, D. Miscanthus-grower June 23, Eure et Loir, France  
De Varine, B. Miscanthus-grower June 24, Eure et Loir, France  
Lecomte, A. Miscanthus-grower June 26, Calvados, France  
Leboeuf, D. Miscanthus-grower June 26, Calvados, France  
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Guillot, N. Miscanthus-grower June 27, Calvados, France  
Dumont, T. Miscanthus-grower July 1, Calvados, France  
Crosnier, R. Switchgrass-grower July 2, Indre-et-Loire, France  
Arrault, X. Miscanthus-grower 
Switchgrass-grower 
July 2, Indre-et-Loire, France  
Guillier, M. Miscanthus-grower 
Switchgrass-grower 
July 2, Indre-et-Loire, France  
Bizieux, F. Miscanthus-grower 
Switchgrass-grower 
July 3, Indre-et-Loire, France  
Fournier, F. Miscanthus-grower 
Switchgrass-grower 
July 3, Indre-et-Loire, France  
Bersonnet, C. Chambre 
d’Agriculture 
July 3, Indre-et-Loire, France  
Jonsson, S. Hemp-grower July 22, Västra Götaland, Sweden  
Wendel, H. Hemp-grower July 23, Skåne, Sweden  
Jacobsson, T. Hemp-grower July 23, Skåne, Sweden  
Andersson, J. Hemp-grower July 24, Skåne, Sweden  
Mårtensson, B. Hemp-grower July 30, Skåne, Sweden  
Bengtsson, L. Former hemp-
grower 
July 30, Skåne, Sweden  
Slagbrandt, R. Agroenergi August 4, Skåne, Sweden Telephone interview 
Ottosson, P. Lunds Energi August 13, Skåne, Sweden  
Rosenqvist, H. Researcher, SLU August 14, Skåne, Sweden Not following question sheet 
Svensson, S-E. Researcher, SLU August 14, Skåne, Sweden Not following question sheet 
Paappanen, T. Researcher, VTT August 18, Jyväskylä, Finland Not following question sheet 
Laitinen,V. Proagria August 18, Jyväskylä, Finland Translation by T. Paappanen 
Luas, P. RCG-grower August 19, Ostbotnia, Finland Translation by T. Paappanen 
Volanto, P. RCG-grower August 19, Jyväskylä, Finland Translation by T. Paappanen 
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Haapamäki, H. RCG-grower August 19, Jyväskylä, Finland Translation by T. Paappanen 
Nyysti, J. RCG-grower August 20 Translation by T. Paappanen 
Hantamäki, M RCG-grower August 20 Translation by T. Paappanen 
Ala-Mäyry, H. RCG-grower August 20, Ostbotnia, Finland Translation by T. Paappanen 
Takala, J. RCG-grower August 20, Ostbotnia, Finland Translation by T. Paappanen 
Kälviäinen, H. RCG-grower August 20, Ostbotnia, Finland Translation by T. Paappanen 
Hipakka, J. Vaskiluodon Voima August 20, Ostbotnia, Finland Translation by T. Paappanen 
Kuasmanen, A. Fortum Voima 
Joensuu 
August 21, Joensuu, Finland Translation by T. Paappanen 
Villa, A. Researcher, Joensuu 
University 
August 21, Joensuu, Finland Not following question sheet 
Rannila, K. Fortum Voima, 
Jyväskylä 
August 22, Jyväskylä, Finland  
Hammar, T. E.ON Malmö August 28, Skåne, Sweden  
Resmark, M. E.ON Malmö August 28, Skåne, Sweden  
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Appendix A 
Compilation Energy Crop Data 
 Salix Hemp Miscanthus Switchgrass Reed Canary Grass 
2 4.5 MWh/dry ton 
(SOU 2007:36) 
5.1 MWh/dry ton  
(SOU 2007:36) 
4-4.4 MWh /dry ton  
(Bical) 
5.1 MWh/dry ton 
(Cardiff School of 
Biosciences)  
5 MWh/dry ton Energy content
 (MTT) 
45-55 %  10-20 % 12-20 %  15-30%  
(Cardiff School of 
Biosciences) 
10-20 % Moisture content 
at harvest 
(SOU 2007:36) (SOU 2007:36) (Bical)  (MTT) 
~25 years (harvest 
every 3-5 years 
1  15-20 years (annual 
harvest) 
10-20 years ~10 years (annual harvest) Lifetime of 
plantation 
134 SEK/MWh  269 SEK/MWh  233 SEK/MWh Establishment cost: 
~3000 SEK/ha 
197 SEK/MWh  Cost of growing3
~42 SEK/MWh  at 
22 dry ton/ha  
71 SEK/MWh at 
7.5 dry ton/ha  
71 SEK/MWh at 7.5 
dry ton/ha 
71 SEK/MWh at 7.5 
dry ton/ha 
71 SEK/MWh at 7.5 dry 
ton/ha 
Harvest cost4
9 dry ton/ha and 
year 
10 dry ton/ha 10 dry ton/ha - 7.5 dry ton/ha Average yield5
120-150 SEK 
/MWh (ate the 
gate) 
 
 
 
120-150 
SEK/MWh (at the 
gate) 
140 SEK/MWh (at the 
gate) 
140 SEK/MWh (at the 
gate) 
100-130 SEK/MWh  (at 
the gate) 
Price of raw 
material6
500 - 600 
SEK/MWh 
(briquettes) 
Cost reduction 
potential 
compared to 
cereals
32 % 12% 18% - 15% 
7
 
                                                 
2 These are indicative figures and can vary with production conditions 
3 Rosenqvist (2006). Cost of cultivation in Sweden incl. machinery and OH-costs 
4 To edge of field. Estimation for Salix from Agroenergi (2006), estimation for grass plants from Sven-Erik Svensson (2008) 
and assumed equal  
5 Rosenqvist (2006) 
6 According to data from producers and fuel-users (2008) 
7 Rosenqvist (2006) 
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Profitability calculation for Salix in Sweden 
Source: Agroenergi 
Plantation year – first harvest (5 years) 
Subsidies and revenues Period/size Amount (SEK) 
Investment subsidy For 2008 5000  
Energy crop subsidy 2000  45?/ha * 5 yrs 
Harvest 16 ton ts/ha 465 SEK/ton ts 7440  
Sum S+R  14 440  
Costs Period/type Amount (SEK) 
Planting For 2008 8600 
Soil preparation Spraying, ploughing and 
harvest 
1700 
Weed control Spraying etc 700 
Fertilizers 500 kg NPK 1500 
Chopping First winter after planting 300 
Sum C  17 000 
Sum C – (S+R)  - 2560 (-512 SEK/ha and 
year) 
 
First harvest  - Second harvest (4 years) 
Subsidies and revenues Period/size Amount (SEK) 
Energy crop subsidy 1600 45?/ha * 4 yrs 
Harvest 23 ton ts/ha 465 SEK/ton ts 10 695 
Sum (SIR)  12 295 
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Costs Period/type Amount (SEK) 
Weed control  350 
Fertilizers 500 kg NPK 1500 
Harvest 23 ton ts 4800 
Sum C  6650 
Sum C- (S+R)  5645 (1411 SEK/ha and 
year) 
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Production and harvesting costs for RCG in Finland 
Source: VTT 
 Loose harvesting Round bales Square bales 
 
 €/ha €/MWh €/ha €/MWh €/ha €/MWh 
      Cultivation 
Control of quick-grass   1,36 0,05   
Ploughing   5,47 0,19   
Harrowing   2,34 0,08   
Sowing   4,27 0,15   
Handling of fertilizer   0,36 0,01   
Roll compaction   1,87 0,07   
Weed control spraying   1,36 0,05   
Seeds 12 kg/ha 5,5 €/kg 6,60 0,23   
Fertilizer 300 kg/ha 378 €/t 11,33 0,40   
Glyphosate 4 l/ha 4,51 €/l 1,80 0,06   
Herbicide 1,5 l/ha 6 €/l 0,90 0,03   
Total 37,66 1,33 37,66 1,33 37,66 1,33 
       
      Ending of RCG plantat. 
Spraying   1,36 0,05   
Glyphosate   1,80 0,06   
Total 3,16 0,11 3,16 0,11 3,16 0,11 
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      Annual fertilizing 
Fertilization   13,60 0,48   
Fertilizer 325 kg/ha 378 €/t 122,69 4,33   
Total 136,29 4,81 136,29 4,81 136,29 4,81 
       
      Harvesting 
Mowing 32,40 1,14 32,40 1,14 32,40 1,14 
Windrowing     17,30 0,61 
Chpping/baling 120 4,24 126,37 4,46 141,00 4,98 
Transp. to field storage  31,46 1,11 27,92 0,99 24,47 0,86 
Storage, labour 14,59 0,52 12,28 0,43 12,34 0,44 
Storage, materials 45,38 1,60 29,32 1,04 25,11 0,89 
Total 243,82 8,61 228,29 8,06 252,62 8,92 
       
      Field costs 
Capital cost of field   138,54 4,89   
Capital cost of drainage   124,44 4,39   
Total 262,98 9,29 262,98 9,29 262,98 9,29 
       
TOTAL 683,92 24,15 668,38 23,60 692,72 24,46 
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Appendix D 
Subsidies for Reed Canary Grass in Finland 
 
€/ha
A B C1 C2 C3 C4
CAP 246,60 195,84 195,84 152,67 152,67 152,67
LFA 150,00 200,00 200,00 210,00 210,00 210,00
LFA national supplement 20,00 20,00 20,00 25,00 25,00 25,00
Environmental subsidy
- Crop farming farm 93,34 93,34 93,34 93,34 93,34 93,34
- Cattle farm 107,00 107,00 107,00 107,00 107,00 107,00
- National supplement
Generel ha subsidy 35,00 51,00 102,00
Energy crop subsidy 30,00 30,00 30,00 30,00 30,00 30,00
Total, crop farm 539,94 539,18 539,18 546,01 562,01 613,01
Total, cattle farm 553,6 552,84 552,84 559,67 575,67 626,67
Support zone
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 Appendix E 
Contractual agreements by Vapo, Finland 
Duration of the contract is 5 years, after which the agreement continues automatically one 
year at the time if neither of the parties serve notice of termination. Vapo is also willing to 
negotiate a new 5-year contract. 
The price is fixed for 5 years (of which the two first years the farmer will have no revenues, 
since the first year of harvest is the third year). It is not bound to any indexes, which is also 
the case for peat and wood chip. 
An unfairness clause stipulates that the price can be renegotiated if circumstances 
fundamentally change. Such circumstances are for example refund or electricity tax to power 
plants, some new support for renewable energy or significant rise of the price paid by power 
plants. 
The price paid to farmers is 50 – 200 Euro/ha depending on the harvest yield, moisture 
content, transportation distance and price paid by the power plant. The base price is 
increased by 10 % if the harvest is over 4,5 dry ton/ha and 20 % if over 6 dry ton/ha (the 
farmer with the highest yield in each of the five districts is awarded with a gift). The best 
price is paid if moisture content is below 14 %, it is lowered if over 20 % and over 30 % 
there is no price paid at all, although Vapo still must fetch the RCG. 
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Appendix F 
Contractual agreements by Vaskiluodon Voima (PVO), Finland 
Duration of the contracts is 5 years. Although the agreement is binding for both parties, the 
farmer can cancel the contract without specific reasons. 
The contract stipulates the form and size of the RCG produced (round/square bales or 
chaff). The bales must be tied with natural fiber Sisal-string or plastic bale net 
Minimum cultivation area is 5 ha.  
The transportation cost is either paid by the producer or the buyer. If the producer delivers 
the bales, this should be done within 2 weeks after harvesting. If the buyer fetches the bales, 
this should be done in early summer according to a fuel use plan. Payment goes through 
when the whole harvest is delivered to the plant. 
The price paid depends on the quality (i.e. moisture content), the price of CO in the ETS 
and the transportation distance (3 distances). The quality is divided into two classes; moisture 
content below 20 % and below 35 %, the highest moisture content allowed. The cost savings 
from CO reductions is awarded the producer up to a maximum of 18 Euro/ton. The 
transportation distance is divided into three categories; under 40 km, 41-80 km and 81-120 
km.  
2
2
Price examples: 
At the gate: assuming quality class 1 and a price of CO  at18/10 Euro/ton, RCG chaff is 
paid 55/43 Euro/ton (at the gate)  
2
At field storage: assuming quality class 1 and a price of CO  at18/10 Euro/ton, bales (1,5 m 
in diameter and minimum 260 kg) are paid 6,1/3 Euro/bale if under 40 km distance to the 
plant, 5,8/2,6 Euro/bale if 41-80 km distance to the plant and 5,1/1,9 Euro/bale if 81-120 
km distance to the plant.  
2
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Appendix G 
Pre-specified questions for producer interviews 
A. Role and importance of dedicated energy crops in the overall farm business 
1. How many hectares are you currently cultivating energy crops on? 
 
2. When did you first plant the energy crop? 
 
3. What were your reasons for planting the energy crop? 
 
4. How much/what kind of work do you put into the plantation? More/less than other crops? 
 
5. What is the yield? 
 
6. Can you estimate your production cost? 
 
7. Who is the buyer of the energy crop and what contract(s) do you have for it? 
 
8. Have you been profitable and are you satisfied with your decision to plant the energy crop? 
 
9. How large is the share of income from the energy crop cultivation of the overall farm income/total 
income of farmer? 
 
B. Cost control, price-setting and contract preferences 
10. Are you currently selling on the root, from the edge of the field or at the gate of the buyer? 
 
11. Would you prefer/consider any of the other options above, and why? 
 
12. Would you prefer the price of the energy crop product to follow the biofuel prices in the region, the 
profitability index for cereals, CPI or any other indexes? 
 
13. Do you prefer a short-term contract (annual), a midterm contract (3-5 years) or a long-term contract 
(>5 years)? 
 
14. (For Salix-growers) Would you prefer a contract that gave you a deduction price for the future crop 
harvest each year instead only having an income at the year of harvest? 
 
15. Are you or would you prefer/consider securing the price of the harvest at the market for futures and 
options? 
 
16. Would you consider an option of total vertical integration from the buyers’ side, like Findus is 
currently growing their peas? 
 
17. Which of the above alternatives would you prefer and would any of them make you more inclined to 
keep your plantation? 
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C. Perception of attitudes towards energy crops 
18. What is the share of cropland in the country that should be dedicated to fuel crops instead of food 
crops? 
 
19. Why do not farmers grow more energy crops in Sweden? 
 
20. If farmers were offered long-term contracts guaranteeing 100 Euro/ha more profits for the energy 
crop than for cereals, how much land would be planted with the energy crop? 
 
D. Perception of risks and barriers associated with energy crops 
21. What risks are there when cultivating an energy crop? 
 
22. Which is more important, the technical, biological or market risk? 
 
23. Is the technical, biological or market risk respectively larger than for cereals? 
 
24. What kind of problems have you experienced? 
 
25. What do you think can be done to reduce the risks associated with energy crop cultivation? 
 
E. Information needs 
 
26. What kind of information do farmers require in order to become interested in growing energy 
crops?Production advice, economic advice or logistical advice? 
 
27. Is this kind of information readily available for farmers? 
 
28. Who is responsible to provide such information? 
 
F. General farm information 
29. Total farm area, share owned and share leased 
 
30. Employees 
 
31. Other business activities at the farm (crop- or cattle production, horses, tourism etc) 
 
32. Age of farmer 
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Appendix H 
Pre-specified questions for fuel-user interviews 
 
A. Role and importance of dedicated energy crops in the overall farm business 
 
1. How large is the share of biofuel and agro-biofuel respectively in the overall fuel use at the plant? 
 
2. What are you motives for using energy crops for combustion at the plant? 
 
3. Have you encouraged production of energy crops at farms in the vicinity? 
 
4. How are the contracts formed that you currently have with suppliers of biofuel/agro-biofuel? 
 
5. How large is the share of fuel costs of total costs for the plant? 
 
6. How important is it for you to secure fuel supply each year or for a few years in the future (how many 
years)? 
 
7. How important is it for you to have a supply of fuel from agriculture? 
 
8. A farmer can choose from year to year to plant a new crop. How could you ”tie” a farmer to planting 
energy crops? 
 
B. Price-setting options and preferences for contractual forms 
 
9. How are you setting the price of agro-biofuel? 
 
10. What other prices or indexes are influential on the price? 
 
11. What are the most important drivers behind price change for heat and electricity? 
 
12. How would your financial results change if the price of agro-biofuel was linked to other fuels in the 
plant, biofuels in general, profitability index for cereals, CPI or other indexes? 
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13. Do you prefer short-term (annual), midterm (3-5 years) or long-term (>5 yeas) contracts? 
 
14. How often shall the price be negotiated? 
 
C. Risk perceptions for energy crop use 
 
15. Have you experienced technical problems from the use of energy crops in the heat/power production? 
 
 
16. How large is the maximum share of agro-biofuel that can be combusted simultaneously? 
 
 
17. Do you see any changes in the risks of securing supply of biofuel? From forestry? From agriculture? 
 
18. Do the suppliers today have more options to choose buyer? 
 
 
 
D. Expectations on future demand for biofuel/agro-biofuel 
 
 
19. Do you see any reasons why the demand of biofuel/agro-biofuel would increase? Political, technical, 
market reasons? 
 
20. Are you interested in other energy crop types than the one you currently use? 
 
21. How do you see the development of the oil price, biofuel prices, national energy mix and 
national/European policies affecting fuel prices (such as the CAP or energy policy)? 
 
a. General company information 
 
22. Producion capacity 
 
23. Company structure and size 
 
24. Type of boilers at the plant 
 
25. Recent/planned investments 
 
79 
Marie Kimming, IIIEE, Lund University 
Appendix I 
Map of Regions and Departments, France 
 
The interviews were conducted in department 37 ( Indre et Loire), department 28 (Eure et 
Loir) and department 14 (Calvados). 
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Appendix J 
Map of Finland 
 
The interviews were conducted in and around Seinäjoki (Ostbotnia), Jyväskylä and Joensuu.  
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